SagittariusA
24時間前
What I read with interest from this EO
Sec. 9. Restoring America’s Mineral Dominance. (a) The Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Administrator of the EPA, Chairman of CEQ, and the heads of any other relevant agencies, as appropriate, shall identify all agency actions that impose undue burdens on the domestic mining and processing of non-fuel minerals and undertake steps to revise or rescind such actions.[...]
(e) The Secretary of Energy shall ensure that critical mineral projects, including the processing of critical minerals, receive consideration for Federal support, contingent on the availability of appropriated funds.
[...]
(i) The Secretary of Defense shall consider the needs of the United States in supplying and maintaining the National Defense Stockpile, review the legal authorities and obligations in managing the National Defense Stockpile, and take all appropriate steps to ensure that the National Defense Stockpile will provide a robust supply of critical minerals in event of future shortfall.
ColdDarkHole
4日前
The elephant in the room is does anyone want to buy it or got to the trouble harvest it?
What scares me is the perceived need for "price points" needing to be good for attractive investment opportunities. So it has to an attractive investment before we acquire critical materials? Really? The DOI and DOE own large important electricity generating resources. C'mon DOD time to own your own mines.
Sec 152 of the bill Wagner posted is intriguing. The US Gov might just be able to ignore markets and prices and just pay whatever the sticker price is for anything they want. They throw away A LOT more money than the cost of this mine. Looks like Pete Hegseth could be the guy to convince, who would have ever thought a fox news guy could possibly affect our retirements 🤣:
From section 152 of
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text
SEC. 152. <<NOTE: 50 USC 98e-2.>> MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
FOR DOMESTICALLY PROCESSED CRITICAL
MINERALS.
(a) Authority for Multiyear Procurement.--Subject to section 3501 of
title 10, United States Code, and from amounts made available by
discretionary appropriations Acts from the National Defense Stockpile
Transaction Fund (as established under section 9(a) of the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h(a))) after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense may enter into
one or more multiyear contracts for the procurement of critical minerals
that are processed in the United States by domestic sources.
(b) Application of Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
Act.--A multiyear contract entered into under this section shall be
deemed to be an acquisition under the Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.).
(c) <<NOTE: Effective date.>> Authority for Advance Procurement.--
The Secretary of Defense may enter into one or more contracts, beginning
in fiscal year 2024, for advance procurement associated with the
domestically processed critical minerals for which authorization to
enter into a multiyear procurement contract is provided under subsection
(a).
(d) Condition for Out-year Contract Payments.--A contract entered
into under subsection (a) shall provide that any obligation of the
United States to make a payment under the contract for a fiscal year
after fiscal year 2024 is subject to the availability of appropriations
or funds for that purpose for such later fiscal year.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``critical mineral'' means a mineral determined
to be a strategic and critical material under section 3(a) of
the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C.
98b(a)).
(2) The term ``processed'' means the processing or recycling
of a critical mineral or magnet, including the separation,
reduction, metallization, alloying, milling, pressing, strip
casting, and sintering of a critical mineral.
(3) The term ``domestic source'' has the meaning given that
term in section 702 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50
U.S.C. 4552).
The_Gman
5日前
Virtual Conference - Critical Minerals and National Security
U.S. Naval War College
Burnstein starts talking @17:10, rare earths/magnets @25:00
Stockpile @50:30
This conference took place on January 10, 2025. The views presented by the faculty or other guest speakers do not reflect official positions of the Naval War College, DON or DOD.
Speakers:
Introduction - Captain Andrea H. Cameron, Ph.D., Ed.D., Permanent Military Professor, National Security Affairs Department; Director, Climate & Human Security Studies Group, U.S. Naval War College
NWC Welcome - Rear Admiral Darryl L. Walker, President, U.S. Naval War College
Keynote - Ms. Carla N. Zeppieri, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Resilience [address delivered by Mr. Adam Burstein]
Panel - Critical Minerals in National Security
• Critical mineral availability, capabilities, and concerns: Mr. Adam Burstein,
Technical Director, Strategic & Critical Materials, ASD, Industrial Base Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
• National Defense Stockpile (NDS): Ms. Theresa Leland, Deputy
Administrator, Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Materials (DLA-SM)
• AGR policy perspective on strategic engagement with allies and partners:
Mr. Gregory Pollock, Principal Director for Arctic & Global Resilience Policy,
ASD Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Background:
In 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order 13817 which drove A Federal Strategy To Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals. This was followed in 2020 with Executive Order 13953 on Addressing the Threat to Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries. President Biden expanded on this further with Executive Order 14017 on America’s Supply Chains in 2021, specifically tasking the Secretary of Defense to identify risks in the supply chain for critical minerals and policy recommendations to mitigate these risks. The DoD delivered the Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains in February of 2022.
In addition to this executive direction, the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified adapting and fortifying the defense ecosystem that includes the defense industrial base and global supply chains. This, in turn, strengthens resilience and adaptability of the force. Building on this, in 2023, the Department of Defense released the first ever National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) offering a strategic vision to coordinate and prioritize actions to build a modernized defense industrial ecosystem that is fully aligned with the strategic guidance. The National Defense Industrial Strategy Implementation Plan for 2025 (NDIS-IP) highlights six initiatives including production and supply chains, allied and partner industrial collaboration, and capabilities and infrastructure modernization. These are directly in support of initiative #1: Indo-Pacific Deterrence.
The combination of defense industrial base support and attaining the necessary critical minerals required for the DoD capabilities to do the mission has led to the rapid developments with the aim to improve these shortfalls and vulnerabilities. In the context of competition with China, where the majority of the minerals are mined and processed, this event examines the role critical minerals play in the DoD, issues with supply chain, storage and stockpiles, and how we can work with allies and partners to achieve improved resilience.
The_Gman
5日前
Resources for Resources: Financing Critical Minerals Supply Chains
REPORT · JANUARY 2025
https://secureenergy.org/resources-for-resources-funding-critical-minerals-supply-chains/
https://safe2020.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/SAFE-Center-for-Critical-Minerals-Strategy-Resources-for-Resources-Financing-Critical-Mineral-Supply-Chains-FINAL.pdf
The investment gap stems from the private sector's inability to effectively manage or accept the unique risks associated
with critical minerals projects. Private capital in open-market economies gravitates toward opportunities where risks are
manageable and returns are predictable—conditions often absent in the critical minerals sector. To address this
challenge, SAFE worked with leading financing experts through the Subcommittee on Opportunities and Risks in the
Critical Minerals Sector (SCOR) to ensure policymakers have a clear understanding of how investors assess projects,
which risks deter investment, and where targeted government action to de-risk investments is needed.
While downstream investment is critical to create demand and incentivize upstream development, the limited focus on
upstream extraction and midstream processing of critical minerals has allowed key supply chain vulnerabilities to
endure. Upstream projects require long lead times to explore, permit, and develop resources, making immediate action
essential. Without greater urgency and investment in upstream production, the United States risks locking in
dependencies on foreign-controlled supply chains, undermining the very clean energy and advanced technology
industries it seeks to support.
To bridge the existing investment gaps in critical minerals policy, the incoming administration must build on effective
measures from the past while addressing key shortcomings. By adopting a more balanced approach that prioritizes
upstream and midstream investments alongside downstream development, the United States can mitigate systemic
market failures, accelerate supply chain resilience, and support national security objectives. This requires targeted
government interventions in areas where the private sector cannot fully address risks.
1. Technical Risks: While private companies excel at managing the complexities of extraction, processing, and
recycling, they often face prohibitive risks in early-stage project development and the deployment of innovative
technologies. Government support is critical to de-risking these activities, particularly through expanded
funding for exploration, research, and development (R&D) and surrounding infrastructure. These efforts will help
expand the pipeline of viable projects, foster innovation, and reduce barriers to scaling cutting-edge
technologies.
2. Financial Risks: Addressing the financial challenges of critical minerals projects requires maintaining and
strengthening federal financial tools, such as low-interest loans, investment tax credits, and direct grants. These
tools must be deployed strategically to target specific gaps in early-stage development, midstream processing,
and co-product recovery, where private capital alone is insufficient. The government can de-risk high-priority
projects, accelerate technological advancements, and build a more secure and diversified supply chain by
counteracting the competitive advantage of China's low-cost, state-backed capital.
3. Compliance Risks: Domestically, permitting reform is needed to improve the clarity, objectivity, and speed of
the process, as well as ensure its effective execution. Improvements should include formalizing early
community engagement to address environmental and social concerns proactively, build trust, and secure a
social license to operate. Establishing clear guardrails is also critical to managing an ever-expanding pool of
stakeholders from delaying strategically significant projects. Internationally, enhancing investor protections and
providing targeted technical assistance to improve regulatory frameworks in developing nations can create
more stable and predictable environments for critical minerals investment.
4. Geopolitical Risks: The PRC’s market dominance, price manipulation, and export restrictions create supply
chain vulnerabilities that private entities cannot address alone. Government action to counteract these
distortions—through enhanced security cooperation,
ColdDarkHole
6日前
That 10M was earmarked for the production of Al-Sc master alloy. That is per the text of our own "news release". On paper, with real math and numbers, this company cannot yet say definitively that they can produce anything. A financing package with ground breaking may change that. The thing that sucks is 10M will not do anything. It will barely kick the can again. I don't know why people get fixated on that 10M. There is no reason to give it to us if all it will do is pay salaries and the light bill for a yet unfunded company. Will 10M even finish the FS if the entire 10M was direct solely to the FS?
If we ever get a facility and a process constructed past a proof-of-concept testing facility, and we get into the business of producing alloys, maybe that 10M will be awarded and used for its intended purpose. Kicking the can in a maybe run or maybe fail scenario is not it. Remember, the business of the DOD is squandering billions abroad not spending 1% of that at home. 🤪
We already made a Al-Sc alloy LOL. That ingot is a cozy 98.6 degrees somewhere over at IBC.
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