Amarin Corporation PLC (AMRN)

Don’t stop contacting IR and the idiots on the BOD who keep the drug Vascepa out of patients hands. Budoff continues to deliver on real science related to plaque. Hold Aron Berg and the BOD accountable. They are complicit in shareholder value destruction and nothing Sarissa and his minions say has value. 
NATURE-CT Study (Budoff et al.) Provides the Missing “Untreated Control” Arm for the Plaque Story
Fellow shareholders,
A new 2026 study in the Journal of Cardiovascular Computed Tomography (NATURE-CT; Aldana-Bitar, Budoff, Karlsberg et al.) quantifies what happens to coronary plaque when patients receive no lipid-lowering therapy. In 205 relatively low-risk individuals (no prior MACE, no statins or other agents, low rates of diabetes/hypertension/smoking), serial CCTA over ~4.9 years showed:
•  Non-calcified plaque volume nearly doubled (median +4.9 mm³/year).
•  Low-attenuation (vulnerable/soft) plaque prevalence rose from 9% to 23% of subjects.
•  Calcified plaque progressed much more slowly.
This is the real-world natural history of untreated atherosclerosis on modern CCTA imaging — from the same research group that conducted EVAPORATE.
Contrast this with EVAPORATE (Budoff et al.): In statin-treated patients with elevated triglycerides (135–499 mg/dL) and known CAD, icosapent ethyl produced regression of low-attenuation plaque (-17% vs. +109% progression on placebo, p=0.0061) along with favorable changes in total non-calcified, fibrofatty, and fibrous plaque. IPE did not merely slow the progression documented in NATURE-CT — it reversed key vulnerable components on top of statin therapy.
This imaging contrast helps explain why REDUCE-IT delivered a 25% relative risk reduction in MACE while fibrates (which can lower triglycerides more but lack plaque regression data) have repeatedly failed to improve cardiovascular outcomes. The FDA’s 2025 fenofibrate label update made this distinction explicit: greater triglyceride reduction does not equal cardiovascular benefit when plaque biology is not addressed.
Commercial reality check
Despite this growing mechanistic and outcomes package (REDUCE-IT + EVAPORATE + NATURE-CT natural history contrast + 2026 AHA CABG Scientific Statement naming icosapent ethyl specifically as third-line for persistent triglycerides 135–500 mg/dL post-statin/ezetimibe), branded utilization remains constrained. AB-rated generics, state automatic substitution laws, and PBM defaults to lowest-cost options continue to limit capture of the very populations where the plaque and outcomes data are most relevant.
Recent trials of new expensive injectables (olezarsen and others such as DR10624) are studying these agents on background icosapent ethyl. This design choice implicitly treats oral icosapent ethyl as foundational therapy and creates a structural opening for step-therapy positioning — but only a buyer with actual cardiology sales infrastructure and sophisticated PBM contracting capability can convert that opening into volume.
The visible LREtEPA formulation work (USPTO/EPO filings) offers one potential path to a non-AB-rated, non-substitutable oral product with its own NDC. A larger strategic owner could use that differentiation, combined with the plaque regression data, to negotiate more favorable payer access than the current single-product company has achieved.
The Barclays strategic review remains the only credible mechanism to place this asset with an owner that has the commercial tools the current board has dismantled. Retail shareholders who want to see the science package finally translated into broader patient access and shareholder value should continue pressing for execution on that review.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

HAPPY BIRTHDAY AMERICA!

I agree with your thinking and also what needs to be considered is after decimating the board, just a desire to be acquired doesn’t automatically make that happen.  Some other party has to be interested in acquiring Amarin. What happens then if no one steps up?

I don't agree with replacing the Sarissa board right now. For all we know, strategic talks could already be happening behind the scenes. The company is finally getting cleaned up—the Hikma case is over, costs have been cut, and the focus can finally shift to the business. Blowing up the board in the middle of all that could do more harm than good. If nothing happens from here, that's a different conversation. But right now, I'd rather see stability than chaos.

Tseven...This is why Amarin needs to market the new formulation in the U.S. prior to receiving an adequate buy out offer...If Thero could do it with Vascepa...so can Sarissa do it withLr-Et-EPA.

If you oust sarissa from the board he will definitely sell all his shares. He is an activist not passive investor. Stock will take a big hit. Also a question. The average premium on bio takeovers was around 75 percent premium. Do you really want a 28 dollar buyout.

We should organize our large retail shareholder community (approx. 75%) for next years' 2027 AGM, to unite voting rights to oust all Amarin Board members tied to Sarissa Capital. It's the only vehicle for retail to initiate BOD change and to position this company to be sold.

European Medicines Agency versus Italian Medicines Agency indications for icosapent ethyl: a long and winding road
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939475326002826

Amarin was removed from the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index on December 18, 2025, which directly removed it from IBB.
Re-entry into the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index (IBB) requires meeting and sustaining:
•  Minimum market capitalization of $200 million
•  Average daily trading volume of at least 100,000 shares
•  Qualification during the annual December reconstitution (using October data)
XBI (SPDR S&P Biotech ETF) follows the S&P Biotechnology Select Industry Index, which has even stricter effective thresholds around sustained market cap and consistent liquidity.
The combination of the 20:1 reverse split in April 2025, sustained revenue decline, low float (~18.51M), and suppressed trading volume has made re-inclusion structurally very difficult. The board had ample cash and the approved $50 million buyback (authorized January 2024, shareholder-approved April 2024) but chose not to execute it. This decision, along with the revenue contraction and reverse split, further damaged the liquidity and market cap metrics required for index eligibility.
This pattern fits Sarissa’s track record. In the Bioverativ/Sanofi deal, Alex Denner and Sarissa Capital faced allegations of using board position for trading profits and settled for $40 million in 2024 (part of a $124 million total recovery) — the largest settlement in history for such M&A fiduciary claims, without admitting wrongdoing.
Under the current ownership structure (retail ~75%), these governance decisions appear to prioritize control and gradual share transfer over actions that would support liquidity, valuation, and index eligibility that would primarily benefit the existing retail base.

Thank you for your reply.

Like you, we are in the midst of some 100 degree days here in the Harrisburg, PA vicinity.

Looking forward to anything positive that may develop.

The second half of this year is about as important as it gets. No progress and our PPS will languish. They(management) must make a move. Revenues obviously need to gain traction but more importantly we need future guidance. What the fck is actually going on behind the scenes and what will actually give us shareholder value. Many of us here need $100 per share now to make a profit. Tough sledding ahead it seems but not impossible.

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/amarin-corporation_womentalk-matters-of-the-heart-part-2-activity-7478469550842257408-2GK7?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_ios&rcm=ACoAAAappXEBEo5xWglK2bmEx478x0aaRWW4o7I

That would be nice.  However MDCO had some significant trial readouts in Q2 and Q3 of that year. 

Your assumption is not correct. But, since Monday, it  has been a long, hot, holiday activity-laden week and upcoming weekend in Washington, and I expect no realistic activity on the issues until next week, if then. The issues and requests for assistance/action have been presented to 2 home-state Senators and 5 other non-home state Senators. A joint email was sent to the Secretary and Under Secretary of Commerce, both of whom have extensive patent-litigation related experience (No staff response yet). More later if/when something of a positive nature happens.

Will this be us next year…

Early 2019 (The Lows): MDCO shares hovered around their 52-week low of $18.83

Mid-2019 (The Breakthrough): The stock steadily climbed past $35–$40 by late summer

November 18, 2019 (Pre-Rumor Close): The stock closed at $58.65 right before major media outlets leaked acquisition talks.

November 24, 2019 (The Merger Announcement): Novartis formally announced the deal to purchase all outstanding MDCO shares at $85.00 per share in cash

I assume you infer that no one has pursued this issue? But that it could/should be.

Read the cited statutory provision and then ask “how did the generics arrive in Amarin’s total market”— an altered document in a series of federal court proceedings amounting to an obstruction of justice should come to mind. There are remedies for that statutory fraud, pure and simple, that likely would result in a quite different case and different article

North, can you clarify what you mean? The entire premise of the article is based on a case of brand vs. generic. So if there were no generics, there would be no case and no article.

I’m wondering what the headline would say if there were no generics in sight, 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(2).

Anyone have access to this site? It's behind a paywall:
https://www.businessreport.com/business/local-pharma-ceo-says-hikma-v-amarin-ruling-brings-clarity-not-new-opportunities

Don’t stop contacting the people in charge of the asset retail owns and don’t swallow narratives sideways. The BOD composition is a Sarissa devised plan. The first CEO that left had to buy shares to play the con. The old CFO already got compensated for what he had to do in the con. Alex Denner is not a good guy. 
The Slow Ownership Transfer & Governance Reality
After more than three years under Sarissa board influence, the picture is clear.
The approved $50 million share buyback was authorized by the Board in January 2024 and approved by shareholders at the April 2024 AGM, but remains unexecuted. On the commercial side, Amarin publicly supported the HealthyWomen Citizens Petition (Docket FDA-2024-P-1988, filed April 2024) requesting FDA revisions to fenofibrate labeling to highlight the lack of proven cardiovascular outcome benefits. Amarin filed supportive comments in June 2024. The FDA issued revised fenofibrate labeling in October 2025. The Hikma litigation was won at the Federal Circuit under Perkins Coie on June 25, 2024 before being lost 9-0 at the Supreme Court on June 4, 2026. The company executed a 20:1 reverse split in April 2025. Revenue declined from approximately $307 million in 2023 to roughly $214 million in 2025. Headcount was reduced to 80 employees and the sales force was eliminated. Amarin was removed from the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index in December 2025. The stock continues to trade near net cash with minimal value assigned to the remaining business or intellectual property.
The Mechanics
With retail owning ~75%, insiders ~2%, and institutions ~23% (Sarissa ~8% within institutions), retail supplies shares on strength through profit-taking from varying cost bases. A small group of specialist institutions quietly accumulate those shares via dark pools (~40–58% of daily volume) and secondary market purchases. Tactical shorts opportunistically fade the pops. The result is a gradual ownership transfer from retail to institutional hands at depressed prices near net cash.
This low-float (~18.51M), retail-heavy structure with elevated dark pool participation enables the slow, steady transfer at compressed valuations.
Governance Reality
Retail shareholders overwhelmingly rejected Sarissa’s proposals at the last two AGMs, yet the board has shown little responsiveness. Following the rejection of dilution proposals at the May 2026 AGM (the second consecutive year), the Board approved paying non-employee directors supplemental cash compensation of approximately $175,000 each in lieu of equity awards. This comes at a time when the company is generating positive cash flow for the first time in years. The ownership imbalance (insiders ~2%, Sarissa ~8%) gives the board full control with modest economic skin in the game. Management responses on earnings calls about capital returns are evasive and pivot to the Barclays process. IR efforts remain passive despite conference attendance. This structure creates limited incentive for rapid value creation that would primarily benefit the current retail majority.

Yep, you can see that very clearly if you superimpose the charts of AMRN and XBI, except for the last 2 days. We need to clear $21 first before thinking something is afoot.

What is up is bio stocks just had their best month in 3
years up 16 percent.

Something’s up, besides the stock price? AMRN closed at $16.47, after hours I see $16.79. Day range: $15.81–$16.79.

AMEN

Removal from NASDAQ Biotechnology Index (IBB) & Ongoing Governance Issues
Amarin was officially removed from the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index on December 18, 2025, which directly impacted its weighting in the iShares Biotechnology ETF (IBB).
This removal occurred under the current Sarissa-influenced board, more than two and a half years after they took control. It was driven by the 20:1 reverse split, sustained revenue decline (from ~$307M in 2023 to ~$214M in 2025), low market cap, and reduced liquidity — all outcomes that have contributed to the stock trading near net cash with minimal credit given to the business or IP.
Sarissa’s Original 13D Promise vs Reality
During the 2022–2023 proxy fight, Sarissa heavily criticized the prior board for value destruction and promised to restore shareholder value through better governance and strategic focus. Instead, we have seen continued revenue contraction, drastic headcount reduction to 80 employees, index delisting, and persistent valuation compression.
This is part of the broader problem: high retail ownership (~75%), low insider ownership (1.98%), and Sarissa’s ~8% stake create misaligned incentives. The board maintains control while the large retail base bears the valuation discount and reduced institutional visibility from index removal.
Trading Mechanics Remain Consistent
Retail supplies shares on strength. Specialist institutions quietly accumulate via dark pools (~40–58% of volume). The result is gradual ownership transfer at depressed prices near net cash.
With LR-EtEPA patent progress, potential EMT2 data, Q3 visibility, and the September conference cluster approaching, serious governance pressure may be needed to ensure the Barclays process actually maximizes value for all shareholders — not just the insiders running it.

Its booming You are all gaziillioanaires !

Amarin Reaffirms the Proven, Guideline-Recommended Role of VASCEPA® (Icosapent Ethyl) in an Evolving Triglyceride Treatment Landscape

https://www.amarincorp.com/news-and-media/amarin-reaffirms-proven-guideline-recommended-role-vascepar?_gl=1*1ntpbpp*_up*MQ..*_ga*MTI2NDc1NjAxMy4xNzgyOTA3Njk2*_ga_HEN7SS1YRY*czE3ODI5MDc2OTYkbzEkZzEkdDE3ODI5MDc2OTgkajU4JGwwJGg2MTcwMjg

Stud
Great minds think alike

That would be a good scenario. I have more confidence in a BP bringing the new formulation to market.  Although I must be fair and honest and say that from Dec 2019 to March 2020 V’s scripts took off and applaud the company for doing a great job with rollout after label expansion. Unfortunately devastated by a couple of grave errors we all know about.

Understood I have a weird feeling as soon as the company knows new formulation is in the books buy back is initiated stock explodes and company is in its last leg of existence before buyout we shall see

It should but I would like to have the information about it from the company to hang my hat on. Waiting for full patent being given and then seeing what the company’s plans for it are.  

Yes but if we get the new formulation won’t that trump everything and be the go to drug????

Of course that is the indication that GV has been approved for and Amarin’s patents invalidated. 

Amarin Highlights Recent FDA Approval Of Injectable Apolipoprotein C-III Therapies For Treatment Of Severe Hypertriglyceridemia, Defined As Triglycerides Greater Than Or Equal To 500 mg/dL
BENZINGA 4:18 PM ET 6/30/2026
Symbol Last Price Change
AMRN 15.94down +0.02 (+0.1256%)
QUOTES AS OF 04:00:00 PM ET 06/30/2026
Amarin Corporation plc (AMRN) , a company committed to advancing the science of cardiovascular disease worldwide, applauds the recent FDA approval of injectable apolipoprotein C-III (APOC3) therapies for the treatment of severe hypertriglyceridemia (sHTG), defined as triglycerides (TG) greater than or equal to 500 mg/dL.i These injectable therapies represent meaningful progress for patients at high risk for serious, sometimes life-threatening diseases associated with sHTG, including acute pancreatitis.

hey! look at us, we're less expensive.

https://investorshub.advfn.com/stock-market/NASDAQ/amarin-AMRN/stock-news/98838882/amarin-reaffirms-the-proven-guideline-recommended

Really not much you can say they have been a disaster they fooled everyone. Other than cutting costs they have done nothing and they continue down the same path.

Thanks Capt....."Conclusions: EPA and lira caused synergistic effects on cellular pathways related to endoplasmic reticulum function and cytoprotection in endothelial cells during inflammation. These actions of a GLP-1RA on protein expression when combined with EPA may ENHANCE CV protection."

With millions of patients currently on GLP-1 meds, it seems like EPA is a logical addition to their meds to avoid initial, or further, episodes of CVD.

That's interesting that this was a year ago. Definitely like the scientists that are on the study.

Do you know if there has been any follow-up on this in any way?

Obviously jumping on the GLP-1 gravy train would be huge.

Here I’m having fun with a topic that is way above my Pay-Grade!
https://www.atherosclerosis-journal.com/article/S0021-9150(25)00597-0/fulltext

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/medicalresearch-cardiovascular-cardiovascularrisk-share-7477345307148779520-cxTH/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAdDmycBzT_CwLIulyFqANe8SLMF4KH2Odo

Don’t stop contacting the scum Sarissa and his affiliates in value destruction. In March 2023, Sarissa Capital won the proxy contest and took control of Amarin’s board. Many investors bought shares at that time, believing the activist had a credible plan to unlock value.
Here is what actually happened to those shareholders.
The stock price at the time of Sarissa’s proxy victory in March 2023 was approximately $1.65 per share pre-split. After the 1-for-20 reverse split in April 2025, that is equivalent to $33.00 per share on a post-split adjusted basis. The current price in late June 2026 is approximately $16.00.
An investor who bought at the equivalent of $33.00 has now lost 51.5% of their investment.
Over the same period, the S&P 500 delivered a total return of approximately +85% to +90% including dividends. An investor who put $10,000 into Amarin at the proxy win now has roughly $4,850. The same $10,000 invested in the S&P 500 is now worth approximately $18,500 to $19,000. That is an opportunity cost of roughly $13,650 to $14,150 per $10,000 invested, plus the actual loss on the Amarin shares.
From 2022 to 2025, revenue fell from $369.2 million to $214.0 million, a decline of $155.2 million. Over the same period, SG&A was reduced from $228.2 million to $128.4 million, and R&D was reduced from $88.4 million to $32.6 million. Total operating expenses (SG&A + R&D) were cut by approximately $155.6 million — almost exactly matching the decline in revenue.
In other words, the company cut spending almost dollar-for-dollar with the loss in top-line revenue. The business became significantly smaller, but it did not become meaningfully more profitable on an operating basis.
Shareholders approved a $50 million share repurchase program. That program was never meaningfully executed. After retail investors voted down equity compensation plans in consecutive years, the board shifted a portion of pay to all-cash instead.
Since Sarissa took board control in March 2023, the board and C-suite have collectively received more than $12 million in compensation while the company cut operating expenses by $155 million, revenue fell by $155 million, and shareholders who bought at the proxy win lost more than half their investment on a split-adjusted basis.
This is not marginal underperformance. This is a clear and measurable destruction of shareholder capital relative to both the initial promise and the opportunity cost of simply owning the broader market.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666667726000528?via%3Dihub

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dlbhattmd_one-of-the-questions-i-get-most-often-from-activity-7477518088461103104-Y1bf?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_ios&rcm=ACoAAAappXEBEo5xWglK2bmEx478x0aaRWW4o7I

All chips are down on the cancer trial

Seems we have some buyers…finally

It’s bad enough we have feckless Michael Torok on the BOD who is stealing compensation pretending to be a CSG but let’s focus on more Sarissa trash. Meet Dianne Sullivan. Must be a DEI hire. Diane Sullivan: The Director Who Was Supposed to Deliver but Hasn’t
Diane Sullivan was added to Amarin’s board in February 2023 as part of Sarissa Capital’s post-proxy refresh. Her main selling point was her background as Chief Commercial Officer at The Medicines Company (MDCO) during the period leading up to its $9.7 billion sale to Novartis. Sarissa repeatedly pointed to that deal during the proxy fight as proof they knew how to create value in cardiovascular assets.
The implication was clear: Sullivan brought real-world experience in cardiovascular commercialization, payer strategy, and large strategic transactions. Shareholders were told this expertise would help fix Amarin’s commercial problems and unlock value.
Three and a half years later, there is still no visible evidence she has delivered on that promise.
Since she joined:
•  Revenue has continued declining from ~$307 million in 2023 to $214 million in 2025.
•  The $50 million share repurchase program approved by shareholders has seen no meaningful execution.
•  After two consecutive years of shareholders rejecting equity compensation plans, the board simply moved a portion of pay to all-cash, creating new recurring cash burn.
•  Twelve months after hiring Barclays, shareholders have received almost no substantive updates on the strategic review, LREtEPA progress, or EMT2 timelines.
At the May 13, 2026 Annual General Meeting, Diane Sullivan received 37.8% “Against” votes on her re-election. That level of opposition is not normal. It reflects clear and widespread shareholder frustration with the board’s performance.
She continues to collect standard non-executive director compensation while the company she was brought in to help fix has produced declining revenue, negligible capital returns, and minimal strategic transparency. There is still no public evidence of any major commercial initiative, innovative access deal, or value-creating transaction she has led or meaningfully influenced since joining.
Sarissa sold shareholders on the idea that MDCO experience would translate into better execution at Amarin. So far, that has not happened. Retail shareholders, who collectively own the large majority of the company, are left watching the same problems persist under a board that includes directors who were specifically added for their supposed expertise.
At some point, claimed experience has to produce actual results. Three and a half years in, that evidence is still missing.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.