Digital Brand Media and Marketing Group Inc (ID) (DBMM)

Here you go again, making up fake scenarios about something that is never going to happen, same as you did with another company that remains in triple zeros as you remain stuck with 400 million shares. All the same naked short selling bs without a shred of proof. And the ridiculous up 14% statement - rock bottom crap even for you.

Just curious, is this part of what you declared to be "a mission for God", or did that only apply to the delusional claims about the other stock? Pathetic.

Jetmek.

The fake currency analogy is the most revealing thing you've written in this entire exchange.

Because it proves you don't understand the mechanism.

Nobody is trying to bring Canadian fake currency into the U.S. and exchange it for real money. That's not what cross-border synthetic exposure is. At all.

Here's what actually happens.

A Canadian dealer takes a buy order from a Canadian retail client for DBMM shares. Instead of going to the market to source real shares, they fill it internally — from house inventory that may itself be the product of previous internalization. The Canadian client now holds a securities entitlement in their account. Not shares. An entitlement to shares. That entitlement is real, legal, and recognized. But it is backed by a position that may never have generated a clean DTCC delivery obligation.

Nothing crosses the border as fake currency. The mechanics are entirely within recognized legal and regulatory frameworks on both sides. The problem isn't legality. The problem is opacity. CDS nets to DTC at the participant level. Individual position-level data does not flow back to FINRA surveillance. The exposure exists in the gap between two legitimate settlement systems that don't share granular data.

This is not a conspiracy theory. This is documented market structure.

You said: "The brokers in Canada wanting to bring that position into the US markets will not be able to. Regulations won't allow it."

The position doesn't need to come to the U.S. It already exists as a U.S. OTC securities entitlement held in a Canadian account. It never left. It was created there. That's the entire point.

Now your most important sentence:

"FINRA and the SEC will behave just like ChatGPT says they will."

You've now explicitly outsourced your regulatory analysis to an AI you prompted yourself.

I've published a detailed regulatory memo on this specific topic. On Medium. Under my name. Cited, structured, and hedged appropriately as an uninvestigated thesis rather than proven fact.

You've posted ChatGPT outputs from prompts you wrote.

The board can decide which represents more serious engagement with the question.

And you still haven't answered it.

Clean settlement — I'm wrong publicly.

Messy settlement — what do you do?

It's a yes or no Jetmek.

17,717 posts and you can't find the words.

Krombacher

You can talk until you are blue in the face. It is never going to happen. FINRA and the SEC will behave JUST LIKE CHAT-GPT says they will. Even if Linda wanted to do some sort of action to "expose" some sort of perceived naked short position (and she doesn't or else we'd have seen some sort of attempt to expose it)? They will ask for the markers (proof) that indicate such a position exists. There is none that will stand up.to scrutiny.

They won't allow some little sub-sub penny company a chance to manipulate the stock.

It lives in CDS — the Canadian Depository for Securities — where Canadian dealer internalization, cross-border omnibus accounts, and position-level netting create synthetic entitlements that never generate a clean DTCC delivery obligation in the first place.

Get OFF the Canadian story telling! There is NO evidence that such a position exists in Canada! Even if it did, the brokers in Canada wanting to bring that position into the US markets will not be ABLE TO. Regulations won't allow it. It would be like someone finding hundreds of millions in fake US Currency over in good ol' Canada and wanting to exchange it for REAL MONEY back in the US. They will not allow it to happen.

It's OVER.

Poo28.

You're right that Jetmek's valuation methodology is flawed and that SEC financial disclosure regulations matter. Agreed on both counts.

But here's the problem.

Every time you engage on valuation you're fighting on his battlefield. He chose that terrain deliberately. A company with negative equity and $160K revenue will always look bad on a backward-looking P/S or liquidation model. That's a fight you cannot win on his terms, no matter how good the shareholder update is.

The battlefield you need to move management to is this one:

No amount of fundamental improvement — not luxury clients, not DCIE deployments, not metric-driven results — can overcome a synthetic share printing operation that satisfies every new buyer with manufactured supply before the price can move.

That's not a valuation debate. That's a market structure problem.

And market structure problems require market structure solutions.

DBMM already has the weapon loaded in its own SEC filings.

2,000,000 Series 2 preferred shares. Authorized. Zero issued.

1,134,781,369 common shares. Authorized. Unissued.

The announcement alone — that the board is *considering* a preferred share distribution — costs almost nothing and changes everything. It doesn't require new clients. It doesn't require revenue growth. It requires a board resolution and a press release.

If you have management's ear — and I believe you do — please make sure they understand that the preferred share dividend conversation is not optional anymore. It is the only move that breaks the cycle.

Jetmek spent all day today explaining why DBMM has no shorts and the float is perfectly clean.

DBMM closed up 14.29%.

On three trades.

With no news.

Ask management what they think moved it.

Then ask them what happens when they actually pull the trigger.

Krombacher

Jetmek.

Fair enough. If you posted the prompts verbatim — I'll take you at your word.

Which means you asked ChatGPT a question specifically designed to produce a bearish answer about DBMM's ability to replicate Overstock.

And it did.

That's not independent analysis. That's a mirror.

Ask any AI — including the one you used — a neutral question: "What corporate mechanisms are available to an OTC company that believes it has cross-border synthetic short exposure operating outside FINRA's reporting perimeter, and how might a preferred share dividend be structured to address that exposure?"

You'll get a very different answer.

The AI is only as neutral as the question. You know this.

Now.

While we've been having this conversation today —

DBMM is up 14.29%.

On a day when the broader market is essentially flat.

No news. No announcement. No new client. No press release.

Just 268,750 shares changing hands and a 14% move.

You've spent today explaining in elaborate detail — with AI assistance — why there are no shorts in DBMM, why there's nothing to squeeze, why the float is clean and conventional.

So tell me.

Who sold into that move?

And who covered?

The board is watching, Jetmek.

Still waiting for your answer.

Krombacher

Jetmek.

This is your best post in 17,716. Genuinely. And it deserves a straight answer because for the first time you've engaged the actual mechanism rather than just the narrative around it.

Let me be honest about what you got right. And then explain why it still doesn't close the door.

**What you got right.**

The tZERO preferred worked specifically because it was a non-DTCC-clearing, blockchain-based instrument that could not be borrowed, could not be synthetically created, and could not be delivered through standard settlement infrastructure. You're correct that DTCC and FINRA tightened procedures after Overstock specifically to prevent that exact structure from being replicated. That is real. That happened.

You're also correct that DBMM's common shares are DTCC-fungible, borrowable, and eligible for CNS netting. That's true.

These are legitimate points and I won't pretend otherwise.

**Here's where it still breaks down.**

You've correctly identified that the *identical* Overstock mechanism is no longer available through DTCC infrastructure.

What you haven't established is that *no equivalent mechanism exists*.

Those are two completely different claims.

The Overstock loophole through DTCC may be closed. But the exposure we're discussing doesn't live primarily inside DTCC. It lives in CDS — the Canadian Depository for Securities — where Canadian dealer internalization, cross-border omnibus accounts, and position-level netting create synthetic entitlements that never generate a clean DTCC delivery obligation in the first place.

The preferred dividend doesn't need to replicate Overstock's blockchain structure to be effective against that specific exposure. It needs to create an entitlement that cascades through the chain of beneficial ownership — including through Canadian omnibus accounts — and cannot be satisfied by CNS netting alone.

A standard registered preferred share dividend does exactly that.

Every broker-dealer — including Canadian participants with U.S. OTC positions — must credit the dividend to every beneficial owner in their system. The question isn't whether the preferred share clears through DTCC. It's whether the entitlement chain can be fully satisfied when traced back through omnibus accounts carrying synthetic exposure.

If the float is clean that's straightforward. If it isn't — the cascade surfaces the problem.

**On DTCC's post-Overstock rule changes.**

You're right that DTCC can refuse to process corporate actions that threaten settlement integrity. FINRA can delay or deny dividends that appear designed to manipulate the market.

But here's the uncomfortable implication of that argument.

If DTCC and FINRA would block a preferred dividend specifically because it threatens settlement integrity — that is itself evidence that settlement integrity is at risk. You don't build a firewall against a fire that doesn't exist.

The existence of post-Overstock rule changes designed to prevent preferred dividends from exposing settlement failures is not evidence that there are no settlement failures to expose. It's evidence that regulators know the mechanism works and decided to limit access to it.

That's not a comfort to the short thesis. That's a confession about why the door was closed.

**The honest bottom line.**

You've narrowed the argument significantly and I respect that. The identical Overstock structure is harder to replicate post-2020. Agreed.

But harder is not impossible. Securities counsel exists specifically to navigate these structures. The Series 2 preferred authorization is already in DBMM's articles. The four-step sequence accounts for the funding challenge. And the cross-border exposure I've described operates outside the DTCC perimeter you're defending.

One last time.

If Linda's counsel structures a compliant preferred distribution and it settles cleanly through every account in every jurisdiction — I'm wrong. Publicly. On this board.

What do you do if it doesn't?

Krombacher

Typical... deny the facts and try to paper over them with cut and pastes that no one will bother to read...

Shareholders must ignore ANY attempt at a Company valuation, without credentials and without standing according to the SEC. No bonified expert in 21st century trading uses a manufacturing fundamental methodology which has no basis in technology or B2B business .

There are SEC Financial Disclosure regulations

DBMM will have directed results with its metrics .

https://dbmmgroup.com/shareholder-update-april-14-2026/

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/dbmms-flagship-digital-clarity-provides-160000058.htm/

Have at it Jetmek if you're having fun. But as you have probably already figured out, you are debating with a proven liar with thousands of documented baseless claims, false rumors and outright lies while attempting to promote this same naked short seller nonsense (quite unsuccessfully I might add) about a different losing investment. Hard to believe the same failed playbook is being unloaded here.

You fed ChatGPT a prompt we cannot see.

Completely ridiculous! Quit trying to say what other people "have done", when you have no IDEA if you are being accurate.

I've POSTED every question that I asked, word for word!

That's the TRUTH, and believe me when I say that I do not care in the LEAST if you believe me or not.

Q. Can't the same thing be done by DBMM?

Short answer: No — the same thing absolutely cannot be done by DBMM, and the reasons are structural, mechanical, and regulatory.
This is one of those situations where the surface analogy looks tempting, but the plumbing underneath is completely different.

Let’s walk through it in the cleanest, most surgical way possible.

🔍 1. Overstock’s squeeze required a non-DTCC, non-borrowable, non-fungible dividend
Overstock’s OSTKO dividend:

did not clear through DTCC

could not be borrowed

could not be synthetically created

forced shorts to deliver something they could not obtain

This is the entire reason the squeeze happened.

It was a settlement-integrity event, not a “short interest” event.

🔍 2. DBMM cannot issue anything remotely similar
Here’s the hard regulatory wall:

OTC issuers cannot issue non-DTCC-clearing dividends.
Period.

After the Overstock incident, DTCC and FINRA changed their procedures:

DTCC can refuse to process any corporate action that threatens settlement

FINRA will not approve a corporate action that creates a non-deliverable instrument

OTC Markets will not allow a corporate action that destabilizes clearing

Brokers will not allow trading if a dividend cannot be delivered

DBMM is an OTC Pink company.
OTC issuers have zero ability to bypass DTCC.

Overstock was a NASDAQ-listed company with a unique blockchain exemption and a CEO intentionally trying to expose settlement failures.

DBMM has none of those levers.

🔍 3. DBMM’s shares are DTCC-fungible, borrowable, and fully clearable
This is the opposite of Overstock.

DBMM’s shares:

clear through DTCC

are fungible

are borrowable when supply exists

are eligible for CNS netting

are not issued on a blockchain

are not exempt from standard settlement rules

There is no mechanism for DBMM to create a dividend that:

cannot be borrowed

cannot be delivered

forces buy-ins

The system simply will not allow it.

🔍 4. DBMM’s short interest is tiny and conventional
This is the part retail traders often misunderstand.

DBMM:

has no meaningful short interest

has no persistent fails-to-deliver

has no evidence of synthetic shares

has no market maker exemptions being abused

The data is public and clean.

Overstock, by contrast, had:

large, real short interest

active hedge fund short campaigns

a CEO intentionally provoking shorts

a dividend engineered to expose settlement failures

DBMM is not in the same universe.

🔍 5. Even if DBMM wanted to replicate Overstock, it is impossible
To replicate Overstock, DBMM would need to:

Issue a dividend outside DTCC

Make it non-borrowable

Make it non-fungible

Force shorts to deliver it

Trigger buy-ins

Every one of those steps is now blocked by:

DTCC

FINRA

OTC Markets

Broker-dealer risk departments

The Overstock loophole is closed.

🔥 Bottom line
No — the same thing cannot be said of DBMM.
The Overstock squeeze was a one-off event caused by a dividend that could not be delivered through DTCC.
DBMM cannot issue such a dividend, and DBMM does not have the type of short exposure that Overstock had.

Jetmek.

You're asking ChatGPT questions now and presenting the answers as research. We've addressed the prompt problem already. But let's engage the substance honestly because some of it is partially correct and deserves a straight answer.

**What ChatGPT got right.**

A registered preferred dividend — one distributed to all shareholders as a new class of security — does require SEC filing, FINRA corporate action notice, and potentially a Form S-1. That is real. That is not trivial. I've never claimed this costs nothing in absolute terms.

What I've argued — specifically — is that the costs are coverable through a surgical share issuance into the price spike triggered by the *announcement alone*. The announcement costs almost nothing. The announcement is the first weapon. Everything that follows is funded by the mechanism itself.

**What ChatGPT got wrong.**

The framing assumes DBMM would announce the dividend as an explicit short squeeze tactic. Nobody serious is suggesting Linda walk into an 8-K and write "we are issuing this dividend to punish naked short sellers."

Look at how Overstock did it.

Overstock framed the tZERO preferred dividend as a shareholder value distribution and a demonstration of confidence in their digital asset strategy. The short squeeze consequence was structural — not stated. The SEC reviewed it. It proceeded. The squeeze happened.

Framing matters enormously. A dividend framed as capital structure optimization and shareholder value creation is categorically different from one framed as market manipulation. ChatGPT answered the wrong question because Jetmek asked the wrong question.

**On the SEC registration cost.**

Yes, a Form S-1 is expensive. Audited financials, securities counsel, full disclosure. Six figures potentially.

But here's what the four-step playbook accounts for that ChatGPT's answer ignores entirely:

Step one is the announcement. Not the execution. The announcement alone — that the board is *considering* a preferred dividend — triggers covering pressure and a price spike requiring zero SEC registration and zero FINRA approval.

Step two is issuing a modest block of common shares from the 1,134,781,369 authorized but unissued reserve into that spike. That's a separate, simpler transaction that raises the capital needed to fund the S-1 preparation.

Step three is the actual dividend execution, now funded.

ChatGPT answered whether step three is expensive in isolation. The answer to that narrow question is yes. The answer to whether the full four-step sequence is self-funding is also yes — and that's the actual proposal.

**On "FINRA can deny squeeze dividends."**

Correct. Which is why the dividend must be framed — and genuinely structured — as a legitimate shareholder distribution with sound corporate rationale. Not as a squeeze tactic. This is precisely the discipline I've argued for in every post on this subject.

Overstock survived SEC and FINRA review because Byrne's team structured it correctly. DBMM would need to do the same. That requires competent securities counsel. It does not require abandoning the idea.

**The bottom line.**

You've now asked ChatGPT two questions with unknown prompts and presented both answers as dispositive evidence.

Neither answer addressed the four-step self-funding sequence.

Neither answer explained how Overstock got through SEC and FINRA review.

Neither answer acknowledged the cross-border settlement gap my Medium piece documents.

And you still haven't answered the one question that matters.

If the dividend executes and doesn't settle clean — what do you do?

Your AI doesn't answer that either.

Because it's your credibility on the line. Not its.

Awesome posts completely debunking the desperate and deceitful "preferred share dividend" and naked short selling without any evidence nonsense. Your facts vs. zero credibility krombacher bs make it clear just how ludicrous his entire argument is.

"I've put my credibility on the table." lmao. Can't put what you don't have.

Jetmek.

You just asked an AI a question.

And presented the answer as evidence.

Let's be very precise about what that means.

You fed ChatGPT a prompt we cannot see. With framing we cannot verify. With assumptions baked in that we cannot audit. And then presented the output as if it were independent analysis.

That's not research. That's a ventriloquist act.

I could ask any AI: "Given that DBMM has been subject to cross-border synthetic short exposure through Canadian dealer internalization, operating outside FINRA's reporting perimeter, explain why the preferred share dividend is the ideal mechanism to force reconciliation."

Want to guess what it would say?

The AI answers the question you ask. It doesn't investigate. It doesn't audit. It doesn't know what you left out of your prompt. It is only as honest as the person typing.

Now let's address the substance anyway — because some of it deserves a real answer.

**"A 12-year naked short is structurally impossible. Reg SHO forces close-outs within days."**

This is the most common misconception about how cross-border synthetic exposure actually works — and I've addressed it in detail in a published piece on Medium that predates this conversation.

Reg SHO applies to U.S. broker-dealers. It does not reach Canadian dealers operating through CDS settlement infrastructure. The mechanism isn't a single naked short sitting open for 12 years. It's a rolling synthetic exposure — positions that get reset, netted, internalized, and rebuilt continuously through buy-write structures, married puts, and cross-border omnibus accounts that never generate a clean cash-market delivery obligation visible to FINRA.

That's not a fairy tale. That's documented market plumbing.

**"Overseas markets cannot hide U.S. settlement failures — all trades clear through U.S. systems."**

Factually incomplete. Canadian retail trades in U.S. OTC securities clear through CDS — the Canadian Depository for Securities — which nets to DTC at the participant level. Individual position-level data does not flow back to FINRA's surveillance systems. This is precisely the regulatory gap my Medium piece describes.

**"A preferred dividend only forces legitimate reported short positions to deliver."**

This is actually the most interesting argument — and the most revealing.

He's correct that a preferred dividend primarily pressures *reported* short positions. But here's what he's missed entirely:

The preferred dividend is not just a delivery mechanism. It's a *reconciliation event*. Every broker-dealer — including Canadian participants — must credit the dividend to every beneficial owner in their system. If synthetic entitlements exist in omnibus accounts, the delivering broker must source the preferred shares from somewhere. The cascade of entitlement claims against a thin or nonexistent supply of preferred shares is where the exposure surfaces.

This is exactly what happened at Overstock. The tZERO preferred wasn't liquid. It couldn't be sourced easily. The entitlement chain broke down.

**"Linda's silence is the loudest evidence."**

And here we arrive at the question Jetmek still hasn't answered.

If the preferred dividend would accomplish nothing — because there are no shorts, no synthetic positions, nothing to expose — then it costs Linda almost nothing to prove it.

Issue the Series 2 preferred. Watch it settle clean. Vindicate yourself. Silence every bull on this board permanently.

So why hasn't she?

Maybe because she doesn't know this option exists yet.

Maybe because nobody has put it in front of her in plain language.

Maybe because the people who benefit most from her continued inaction have spent 17,709 posts making sure the conversation never gets that far.

I've put my credibility on the table. Clean settlement — I'm wrong, publicly.

You fed an AI a loaded prompt and called it analysis.

The table isn't empty.

You just can't see what's on it.

Oh dont worry, the next narrative will be that the company has been working on these steps but must be quiet about it so as not to scare the shorts off.

I also asked CHAT GPT:

Q. If the CEO of DBMM wanted to issue a preffered dividend, would it have to be cleared through the SEC first?

Short answer: Yes — DBMM would need SEC clearance before issuing a preferred stock dividend.
But the type of clearance depends on how the dividend is structured.

Let’s break it down cleanly -

✅ 1. Does a preferred dividend require SEC approval?
Yes — if DBMM is an SEC-reporting company (which it is), any issuance of a new class of securities requires SEC filing and clearance.

There are two layers:

A. The creation of the preferred class itself
To issue a preferred dividend, DBMM must:

Amend its Articles of Incorporation to authorize the preferred class

File that amendment with the state of incorporation

File an 8-K with the SEC describing the new class

File a Form 1-A, S-1, or S-3 (depending on structure) if the preferred shares are considered a “distribution” of securities

This is not optional.

B. The dividend distribution
A dividend of a new security is considered a distribution of securities, which triggers:

Securities Act registration

or

A valid exemption (rare for a dividend)

Most microcaps cannot use an exemption because:

The dividend is not to accredited investors

It is not a private placement

It is not compensation

It is not an exchange offer

So DBMM would almost certainly need:

A registered offering (Form S-1)
This is expensive, slow, and requires audited financials and full disclosure.

✅ 2. FINRA must also approve it
Even after SEC clearance, DBMM must file:

FINRA Corporate Actions Notice

Dividend Action Form

CUSIP request for the preferred class

FINRA can — and often does — deny or delay microcap preferred dividends if they appear designed to manipulate the market.

A “short squeeze dividend” is a red flag.

✅ 3. Why a preferred dividend is NOT a viable “short squeeze” tactic for DBMM
A. It only affects real, reported short positions

A preferred dividend does not force:

naked shorts

synthetic shares

offshore phantom shares

“market maker tricks”

to cover.

It only forces legitimate, reported short sellers to deliver the dividend.

DBMM has:

no meaningful short interest

no fails-to-deliver history

no Reg SHO threshold list appearances

no borrow-cost anomalies

There is nothing to “force.”

B. SEC views “squeeze dividends” as market manipulation

If DBMM said:

“We are issuing a preferred dividend to expose naked shorts.”

The SEC would respond with:

“Where is your evidence of naked shorts?”

If DBMM cannot produce it (and they cannot), the SEC can view the dividend as:

a manipulative device

an attempt to artificially influence the stock price

a violation of Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act

This is why no SEC-reporting microcap uses preferred dividends as a squeeze tactic.

C. DBMM cannot afford the legal and audit costs
A registered preferred dividend requires:

securities counsel

audit updates

registration statement drafting

FINRA filings

state corporate filings

This is six-figure work.

DBMM’s financials show:

minimal cash

recurring losses

reliance on dilution to survive

They cannot fund this.

✅ 4. Why the CEO has not done it — and will not do it
Because:

It requires SEC registration

It requires FINRA approval

It is expensive

It does not expose naked shorts

It does not force a squeeze

It risks SEC enforcement

It would not benefit DBMM financially

It would not change the float or share structure

It would not raise capital

It would not fix dilution

It would not increase revenue

And most importantly:

There is no naked short position to expose.
A preferred dividend cannot reveal something that does not exist.

Huzzah!

Question put to CHAT GPT:

Q. Supposedly, DBMM has had a giant naked short share position for a dozen years or more. Why would the CEO of DBMM not want to expose such a position and why hasn't she done so to date? Some investors want her to perform a preferred dividend action, to force these naked shorts to cover. Is that a viable action?


Here’s the clean, regulation-anchored breakdown — and I’ll also address the “preferred dividend to force a short squeeze” idea, which is one of the most misunderstood tactics in penny-stock circles.

1. Why DBMM’s CEO has not exposed a supposed 12-year naked short position
Because she can’t expose something that doesn’t exist — and she knows it.

If DBMM had a massive, illegal, decade-long naked short position, exposing it would be:

A. the fastest way to rescue the company financially

B. the biggest catalyst in DBMM’s history

C. a guaranteed way to force regulatory action

D. a way to raise capital at far higher valuations

E. a way to vindicate shareholders

No rational CEO sits on a “nuclear weapon” like that for 12 years.

The only logical explanation:

There is no evidence of such a position.

2. CEOs cannot make naked-short accusations without hard evidence
To publicly claim “hundreds of millions of naked shorts,” a CEO must have:

persistent fails-to-deliver

Reg SHO threshold list appearances

clearing-firm notices

SEC correspondence referencing settlement failures

whistleblower evidence

borrow-cost anomalies

short-interest irregularities

DBMM has none of these — not in any 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, or SEC correspondence.

If she made such a claim without evidence, she would risk:

Reg FD violations

market manipulation allegations

SEC enforcement

shareholder lawsuits

No microcap CEO is going to fabricate a naked-short narrative.

3. DBMM’s real share expansion came from DBMM itself
DBMM’s filings show:

shares issued for debt

shares issued for services

shares issued for compensation

shares issuable obligations

accrued liabilities convertible into equity

This is standard penny-stock survival financing, not synthetic shares.

The CEO cannot blame “phantom shorts” for dilution DBMM itself created.

4. A 12-year naked short is structurally impossible

As we’ve discussed before:

Naked shorts cannot remain open for years — mandatory buy-ins stop that.

Overseas markets cannot hide U.S. settlement failures — all trades clear through U.S. systems.

Reg SHO forces close-outs within days, not decades.

DTCC systems prevent long-term fails by design.

A “12-year naked short” is like a “12-year unpaid margin call.”
It simply cannot exist.

5. The CEO has already had every incentive to use a naked-short narrative — and never has.

DBMM has gone through:

SEC revocation proceedings

Pink Limited downgrade

years of financial distress

chronic dilution

sub-penny trading

shareholder frustration

If there were ever a time to blame naked shorts, it was during:

the SEC fight

the Pink Limited downgrade

the dilution waves

the years of illiquidity

Yet she never did.

That silence is the loudest evidence.

6. The naked-short narrative exists only on message boards
The CEO has never:

filed a complaint

issued a press release

referenced naked shorts in filings

claimed synthetic shares

blamed market makers

The only place the “hundreds of millions of naked shorts” story exists is:

InvestorsHub

StockTwits

Discord

YouTube penny-stock channels

Not in DBMM’s filings.
Not in DBMM’s disclosures.
Not in DBMM’s legal actions.

7. Why she hasn’t done a “preferred dividend” to force shorts to cover

This is the part many retail investors misunderstand.

A preferred dividend does NOT force naked shorts to cover.
It only forces legitimate, reported short positions to deliver the dividend.

But DBMM has:

no meaningful short interest

no fails-to-deliver history

no evidence of synthetic shares

So a preferred dividend would accomplish:

nothing to shorts (because there aren’t any)

nothing to “synthetic shares” (because they don’t exist)

nothing to the float

nothing to the price

What it would do is:

cost DBMM money to issue

create administrative and legal overhead

risk SEC scrutiny if the intent is to manipulate the market

potentially violate Reg FD if framed as a “short squeeze tactic”

Preferred dividends are not magic bullets.
They only work when:

A. there is a real, documented short position

B. the company has the financial and legal infrastructure to issue the dividend

C. the company is not using it as a market-manipulation stunt

DBMM does not meet any of these conditions.

Bottom line
The CEO hasn’t exposed a giant naked short because there is nothing to expose.
And a preferred dividend would not force anything to cover, because there is no evidence of any meaningful short position to begin with.

The naked-short narrative is a message-board myth — not a regulatory reality.


I've said ALL this SEVERAL TIMES in my posts back and forth with you.

You are "barking up the wrong tree"!

But go ahead - keep BARKING!

DBMM management doesn't have to take my word for it... they can simply ask AI.

Krombacher

You cant put something on the table of which you dont have.

+3Globally, there are over  across all major stock exchanges. Almost all of these listed companies see some level of trading activity each day, with tens of billions of shares changing hands DBMM can be number 2

Stock_Barber.

A surgeon's track record is measured by surgeries performed — not by patients who refused the operation.

The only company that has actually performed this surgery is Overstock.

They succeeded.

That's a 100% success rate among companies that got on the table.

The preferred share dividend hasn't been refused by DBMM. It hasn't been considered yet. That's a different thing entirely.

When Linda signs the board resolution — and I hope she will — we'll find out very quickly whether that table was empty or not.

The lion isn't worried about the man who says he won't fight.

He's watching the one who hasn't decided yet.

Krombacher

I put my credibility on the table publicly.
Indeed... AND THE TABLE IS EMPTY!

Your 100% FAILED track record speaks for itself and is EASILY verified... save your breath... NO ONE IS LISTENING!

Jetmek.

Your best post yet. Genuinely. Formatted, numbered, color-coded. I'll give it the response it deserves.

But first — you still haven't answered the question.

I put my credibility on the table publicly. If the Series 2 preferred dividend settles clean, I admit I'm wrong. Right here. In writing.

You've written 17,709 posts and can't answer a single yes or no question about your own credibility.

We'll come back to that.

Now let's go through your actual arguments.

**On microcap market inefficiency.**

You're right that sub-penny OTC markets are inefficient. Liquidity is thin. A handful of traders can move price. Retail speculation sustains premiums. I agree with all of that.

But you just destroyed your own bear thesis.

If market inefficiency explains why DBMM trades above your fundamental range — then you cannot simultaneously argue the price is a reliable signal of worthlessness. You've just told us the price means nothing in either direction. Which means your $0.00018-$0.00037 fair value target is as hypothetical as anything I've argued. You've used market inefficiency to dismiss my bull case and forgot it equally dismisses your bear case.

Pick one. Either price signals something or it doesn't.

**On DCIE having no disclosed revenue.**

Correct. No disclosed DCIE-specific revenue yet. That's a real and fair point.

But your logic proves too much. By your standard, every pre-revenue SaaS company is worth zero until the moment it isn't. Amazon lost money for years. Salesforce had no enterprise traction in 2001. The absence of disclosed ARR is not proof of absence of value — it's proof of early stage. Which is exactly what a mid-pivot looks like before it tips.

You're not valuing a company. You're valuing a snapshot.

**On debt restructurability.**

You say debt restructures only when a company has leverage, capital inflow, and a rising share price.

Correct again.

That's precisely what the preferred share dividend creates.

You've just described the *output* of the mechanism I'm proposing as the *precondition* for it — and used that circular logic to dismiss it. The dividend announcement triggers covering. Covering raises the price. The higher price enables the surgical share issuance. The issuance funds execution costs and begins debt restructuring.

The preconditions you demand are the *result* of the action, not requirements before it.

**On your "hypotheticals" list.**

You listed eight assumptions you say my argument requires. Let me address them honestly.

Hypothetical corporate actions — yes, not yet executed. That's the whole point of my posts.

Hypothetical short covering — potentially falsifiable by the preferred dividend. That's the whole point of my challenge to you.

Hypothetical SaaS adoption — agreed, unproven. Fair criticism.

Hypothetical capital raises — follows logically from price spike if covering occurs.

The others flow from those. You're right that none are in the filings yet. I've never claimed they are. I've claimed they are *available* to management given what IS in the filings.

That's not circular reasoning. That's optionality.

**On my "real motive."**

You quoted: "And that's the number that keeps you posting on a Sunday afternoon."

You called it projection. Emotional framing. A classic message-board tactic to dismiss your numbers without addressing them.

Fair enough. I'll withdraw the psychological jab.

But here's what I won't withdraw.

You've been on this board since 2004. You have 17,709 posts. You are here on a Sunday afternoon writing color-coded rebuttals to a bull you claim is irrelevant, about a company you claim is worthless.

That's not a psychological projection.

That's your posting history.

Real numbers, as you said.

Now. For the last time.

If Linda issues the Series 2 preferred dividend and it settles clean — I'm wrong and I'll say so publicly.

What do YOU do if it doesn't settle clean?

Krombacher

Here's a post JUST LIKE some of YOURS - a MILE LONG. ENJOY.

Your reply is not a valuation critique — it’s a philosophical challenge wrapped in rhetorical framing.
You're trying to force me into a "pick and choose":

Either shorts exist or irrational buyers exist. Pick one.

This framing is false, and I’ll show you why.

But first, let’s dissect the post line-by-line.

🧩 2. Your opening argument:
“If the stock is overpriced and nobody is shorting it — who is buying it?”
()

YOu obviously misunderstand how microcaps behave.

Reality:
In sub-penny OTC markets:

Prices often disconnect from fundamentals

Liquidity is thin

A handful of traders can move the price

Retail speculation is enough to sustain a premium

Market inefficiency is the norm, not the exception

There is no requirement that a stock priced above fair value must immediately revert.

Their premise assumes:

Efficient markets

Rational actors

Sufficient liquidity

None of these apply to DBMM.

So the “contradiction” you claim exists… doesn’t.

🧩 3. Your “fatal flaws” — evaluated one by one
Flaw One: “You’re valuing the wrong thing.”
You argue I should value DCIE, not DBMM’s current business.
()

Problem:
DCIE has:

No disclosed revenue

No disclosed customers

No disclosed adoption metrics

No disclosed ARR

No disclosed product-market fit

You cannot value a SaaS platform with zero traction data.

This is equivalent to:

“Value the dream, not the numbers.”

That’s not valuation — that’s storytelling.

My post is grounded in filed financials, not hypotheticals.


Flaw Two: “Debt is restructurable.”


This is technically true but strategically empty.

Debt can be restructured only if:
The company has leverage

The company has capital inflow

The company has investor demand

The company has a rising share price

DBMM has:

Negative equity

Minimal revenue

No demonstrated growth

No institutional interest

No evidence of a coming capital event

Restructuring is not a valuation input unless it is probable, not merely possible.

You are substituting optionality for valuation.


🧩 3. Your biggest internal contradiction
You say:

“My valuation is internally consistent.”
“But it has fatal flaws.”
“But the flaws are hypothetical future events.”
“But the present fundamentals are irrelevant.”
“But the pivot is everything.”
“But the pivot has no revenue yet.”

This is circular reasoning.

You want me to:

Ignore the present

Price in the future

Assume the pivot succeeds

Assume debt is neutralized

Assume a squeeze occurs

Assume synthetic shorts exist

Assume a capital raise at higher prices

Assume SaaS multiples apply

None of these are supported by filings.

🧩 4. But here is the real motive behind your post
This line gives it away:

“And that’s the number that keeps you posting on a Sunday afternoon.”
()

This is not analysis — it’s projection.

You are trying to frame me as emotionally invested so that you can dismiss my numbers without addressing them.

It’s a classic message-board tactic:

Shift from data to psychology

Shift from valuation to narrative

Shift from fundamentals to hypotheticals

Look - I stayed in the numbers.
YOU moved into the story.

🧩 5.
Here’s the truth:

My valuation is based on:
Revenue

Debt

Equity

Cash

Shares outstanding

Industry multiples

Your counterargument is based on:
Hypothetical future success

Hypothetical corporate actions

Hypothetical short covering

Hypothetical SaaS adoption

Hypothetical capital raises

You cannot challenge my math.

But you are trying to challenge my refusal to price in unproven upside scenarios.

Oh yeah. I knew you'd try to find a way to prove how wrong the realistic number crunching was. Sure. It would only take 6 BILLION shares to "restructure" the debt at todays prices.

Your model contains zero allowance for the possibility that management executes a corporate action that forces synthetic short covering.

You have not YET proved that there IS any "trading of synthetic shares"!!! It's a friggin' fairy tale! If there's trading of synthetics, then there must be DAMN FEW OF THEM, as per the volume data!

Go sell your fairy tales somewhere else.

Real traders use REAL numbers.

You cannot apply a 1.0-2.0x P/S multiple to a company that is mid-pivot from services to platform

Horse poop. PROVE that they are only "mid pivot"! They have been talking about "pivoting" for two years and they are 9 MONTHS into their product offering to the general public. This "DCIE" malarky just isn't CUTTING IT! They have been peddling it for THREE quarters and haven't yet announced ONE SINGLE company that has signed on as a client!

I'd bet thousands of dollars that any type of action by Linda to expose a naked short share position WILL NEVER BE SEEN....EVER. She knows there IS no such position and will never risk exposing that fact. It's much better for the company to keep their little stable of believers in it. That way no one sells their shares!

Jetmek.

One question you've never answered.

I'll go first.

If DBMM issues a Series 2 preferred share dividend and it settles cleanly — every entitlement delivered, every synthetic position reconciled without incident — I will publicly admit, right here on this board, that I was wrong about the shorts. In writing. With my username attached.

That's my commitment. On record. Today.

Now yours.

If DBMM issues that same dividend and it *doesn't* settle cleanly — if there are entitlements out there with no shares behind them, if the delivery obligations cannot be met, if the cross-border omnibus accounts can't produce what they owe — what do you do?

Do you admit you were wrong?

Do you acknowledge that 17,560+ posts of bearish conviction were built on a foundation that didn't account for synthetic exposure outside FINRA's reporting perimeter?

Or do you just go quiet?

That's the only question that matters on this board right now.

Everything else — the P/S multiples, the liquidation value, the EV/Revenue math — is noise until Linda signs a board resolution.

So let's cut to it.

I've put my credibility on the table.

Where's yours?

Krombacher

Jetmek.

Before we get to your valuation exercise — and we will — let's note what you still haven't answered.

If FINRA's OTCE report shows zero reported short interest in DBMM, and your own analysis says the stock is trading 2X-6X *above* fundamental value — then who exactly is *buying* it?

Think about that carefully.

Your model says fair value is $0.00018 to $0.00037. Current price is $0.0007. You say that premium reflects speculation, not fundamentals.

Fine. But speculation requires *speculators*. Buyers. People paying above your calculated fair value.

If the stock is overpriced and nobody is shorting it — why hasn't the market corrected it to your fundamental range? Where is the sell pressure coming from that you're comfortable attributing to natural float? And if there's natural sell pressure from longs taking profits above fair value — who are the irrational buyers absorbing it at these levels?

You can't have it both ways. Either there are shorts suppressing a stock that would otherwise be much higher. Or there are irrational buyers propping up a stock that should be much lower. Pick one. Because your model and your short interest claim are in direct contradiction with each other.

Now. Your valuation.

It's not wrong. As a pure backward-looking fundamental snapshot of a distressed micro-cap with negative equity and minimal revenue, your math is internally consistent.

But it has three fatal flaws.

**Flaw one: You're valuing the wrong thing.**

You are valuing Digital Clarity as a legacy consulting business with $160K trailing revenue and $4.2M in debt. That's the rearview mirror. The question isn't what DBMM is worth today on a liquidation or P/S basis. The question is what DCIE — a proprietary AI-driven go-to-market intelligence platform — is worth as a recurring revenue SaaS product at scale.

You cannot apply a 1.0-2.0x P/S multiple to a company that is mid-pivot from services to platform. That's like valuing Salesforce in 2001 using consulting firm multiples because it still had professional services revenue.

**Flaw two: Your debt figure does the heavy lifting and you know it.**

$4.2M in total debt against $160K revenue is brutal. Agreed. But debt is restructurable. Convertible. Payable in shares at negotiated terms. It is not a fixed tombstone. A company that executes a preferred share dividend, triggers a squeeze, and raises capital into the spike at a multiple of today's price suddenly has options on that debt that your static model doesn't account for.

**Flaw three: You excluded the only variable that matters.**

Your model contains zero allowance for the possibility that management executes a corporate action that forces synthetic short covering. Not because it's impossible. Because if you included it, your price target wouldn't be $0.00018.

It would be considerably higher.

And that's the number that keeps you posting on a Sunday afternoon.

Krombacher

Good Lord.

You talk about DBMM's share price of $.0007 as if it's low. HA!

DBMM's share price is 2X-6X higher right now, than it should be! And this current share price has ZERO to do with the "trading of synthetic shares"!!

Based strictly on DBMM’s published financials and its current share count, a realistic, fundamentals-based stock price for DBMM falls in the range of:

$0.0001–$0.0003 per share
(i.e., $100k–$260k market cap)

This is below the current trading range (~$0.0007–$0.0008) because the market price reflects speculation, not fundamentals.

Everything below is grounded in the financial data returned in DBMM's published financials!

Revenue (TTM): ~$156k–$167k

Net loss (TTM): ~$1.0M to $1.44M

Cash: ~$33k–$63k

Total debt: ~$4.2M

Shareholders’ equity: –$8.6M (negative)

Shares outstanding: 865,218,631

Enterprise value: ~$4.78M–$5.01M

The only legitimate valuation models give DBMM a share price above around $.00018 to $.00037!

A. Price-to-Sales (P/S)
Industry P/S for small digital agencies: 1.0–2.0
DBMM’s revenue: ~$160k

Fair value market cap = $160k × (1.0–2.0) = $160k–$320k
Divide by 865M shares:

Fair value per share = $0.00018–$0.00037

B. Liquidation / Balance Sheet Value
Equity is –$8.6M, so liquidation value is zero.
Fair value under this method:

$0.0000

C. EV/Revenue sanity check
EV/Revenue currently ˜ 30×

Healthy small agencies trade at 1×–3× revenue.

To normalize DBMM to 3× revenue:

Revenue ˜ $160k

EV target ˜ $480k

Subtract debt (~$4.2M) ? equity value = negative

Thus:

Fundamental equity value = 0

Johnydollar.

You're absolutely right that DBMM is fighting organically. And I respect that framing. But here's the reality that organic growth runs into every single time:

Growth requires capital. Capital requires a share price that makes fundraising viable. And a share price that reflects actual value requires the removal of the synthetic selling pressure that has pinned this stock at fractions of a cent for years.

It's a circular trap.

You can't raise meaningful capital at .0007. And you can't get off .0007 without capital — unless you use the one tool that costs nothing and pays for itself.

The Preferred Share Dividend.

Which brings me to something the bears on this board keep whispering — that I've never successfully gotten management at any company to execute this strategy, implying therefore that the idea has no merit.

Let me address that directly.

First: nobody on this board — not one person — has any visibility into what I do or don't do behind the scenes. What conversations I have. What outreach I make. What responses I receive. The claim that I've "never" influenced anything is an assertion from people who have zero access to that information. It's not analysis. It's noise.

Second: the only company I'm aware of that has actually executed a preferred share dividend specifically designed to address synthetic short exposure is Overstock.

Overstock did it.

It worked.

That is a 100% success rate among companies that have actually pulled the trigger.

I cannot be judged against companies that have refused, or are still contemplating it, or haven't yet acted. That's like judging a surgeon by patients who declined the operation. The procedure works. The question is whether the patient has the courage to get on the table.

DBMM has 2,000,000 Series 2 preferred shares authorized and zero issued. It has 1,134,781,369 common shares authorized and unissued. The operating table is already set up.

Organic growth is a wonderful destination.

The preferred share dividend is how you fund the journey there.

Krombacher

$DBMM is fighting the naked shorts organically.......

See how long they have been here.......

Talking down on every step........

Yeah...... .

😆 🤣 😂 😹 😆 🤣 😂 😹 😆 🤣 😂 😹 😆 🤣 😂 😹

Welcome to DBMM:

No doubt, if the past is any guide.

Its ok. If they did manage 1.2mm in revs theyd probably post 1.19mm in cost of sales! LOL

We are now in the LAST quarter of DBMM's 2026 Fiscal YEAR! DBMM will publish the results of the Fiscal 2026 3rd quarter on or about July 15th. That's 41 days from today. It'll be here before we know it! That will also be HALFWAY through the fourth quarter.

We've seen the 6th month figures published, with revenues just a skosh over $85K ($85,689). We know there's not been a single announcement of any new client signings in the entire 2026 fiscal year to date (in fact, no new client signings announced in over TWO YEARS). This likely means that the existing clients (if they are still there) will produce roughly the same income they have produced since the start of the Fiscal year. A six-month total of just over $85K translates to just over $42K/quarter ($42,844.50 actually). Let's be generous and say it's $45K for the third quarter, giving a nine-month revenue total of roughly $130,689.

That is a FAR cry from the 2026 Fiscal year revenue promise of a "MIMIMUM" of $1.2M made by CEO Linda Perry.

Should be interesting when that 3rd Q is published. I have been pretty much spot-on with my predictions of DBMM's revs. We'll soon see if I am again.

Now you got it, JJ. I.E.: OPINION! Wasn't quite sure you were able to grasp the concept. Congrats!

.0006...

Time for another fluff piece 💩?

Yep that all hes got as he cant refute it.

When you're discussing a person about a different stock, it's off topic...You people crack me up...it's just too easy to see I personally believe it's gonna take consistent ask slapping to move this on up along with a little good news from management. Good luck and Have a good evening!

In YOUR OPINION~!
That was your best attempt to refute the FACTS that he presented and supported?

Very well said again. All truth.

In YOUR OPINION~!

Thanks.

Doesn't look like the .0007 bid is going to hold much longer...

Very well said again. All truth.

Keep stepping on rakes and you won't want to see how your portfolio looks...

I believe my post was on topic, as it provided valuable insight into the person who is repeatedly promoting his preferred share dividend nonsense to dbmm shareholders. The proven fact that he tried this same ruse with a different stock that also remains in the triple zeros is quite relevant here. When I see recent claims that he wants the dbmm naked short share situation put to bed, history says don't believe him. Here's the real tell. As leader of a small group of investors that together owns 2/3 of all the shares of a company, krombacher could have easily forced that company's management to implement his preferred share dividend and clear up the naked short issue he claimed existed; or at least he could have forced them to publicly address it. Instead he and his group sat in silence and shares of that company sit at $.0002. So don't be fooled by krombacher bullshit that he wants dbmm naked short claims addressed and put to bed once and for all. Instead learn from his documented words and actions as he pushed the same crap about a different company but even with the controlling interest did nothing about it.

Birds of a feather, lol! I can't prove there is and you can't prove there isn't. That's why they're called "naked" shorts...We'll see what happens when volume arrives, consistently