primecomm
1週前
Stockstoretirement: $RDAR Based on current financial data, Televantis, Inc. (RDAR) is trading heavily discounted below its mathematical intrinsic value.
To find the true target value per share, we divide the intrinsic market cap range ($43.7 million to $51.7 million) by the official outstanding share count of 7,996,260,674 shares (approximately 8 billion shares):
Bear Case Target Valuation ($43.7M Cap): $0.0055 per share
Bull Case Target Valuation ($51.7M Cap): $0.0065 per share
Compared to its actual open-market trading price of $0.0002 to $0.0003, the intrinsic math indicates that the stock is fundamentally undervalued by 1,700% to 2,000%
9:53 AM
throw me a bone
2週前
Mexedia announces the reduction of its shareholding in Telvantis to 49%
Rome (Italy), 23 June 2026 – Mexedia S.p.A. Società Benefit (Euronext Growth Paris:
ALMEX, ISIN IT0005450819) (“Mexedia” or the “Company”) announces that, following the
completion by Telvantis Inc. (OTC: RDAR) of the acquisition of the operating entities of
AmeriCrew Inc. (OTC: ACRU), announced on 5 May 2026, Mexedia’s shareholding in
Telvantis has decreased from 75% to 49%.
The reduction results solely from the dilutive effect connected with the closing of the
AmeriCrew transaction, in connection with which Telvantis issued new shares of a voting
preferred class (Series G Voting Convertible Preferred Stock) to the members of
AmeriCrew, without any sale of shares by Mexedia. The transaction forms part of the path
already disclosed to the market through the Company’s press releases of 7 October 2025
and 30 December 2025, relating respectively to the signing of the agreement for the
acquisition of AmeriCrew by Telvantis and to the disposal of the Telvantis Voice Services
business to Spectral Capital Corporation.
As a result of the reduction of Mexedia’s shareholding in Telvantis to 49%, Mexedia no
longer holds a controlling interest in Telvantis. Consequently, Telvantis will no longer be
fully consolidated in Mexedia’s financial statements; the related accounting effects are being
determined and will be reflected in the Company’s financial reporting. The deconsolidation
of Telvantis will have a significant effect on the size of Mexedia's consolidated scope,
including on consolidated revenues and total assets as reported in future financial
statements. Mexedia will provide the market with timely updates in accordance with the
applicable regulatory provisions.
Paolo Bona, Chief Executive Officer of Mexedia S.p.A. Società Benefit, commented: “This
transaction reflects Mexedia’s progressive focus on its core activities. We will continue to
Krombacher
2週前
Re: the "scam" framing — an alternate reading from the same facts
I don't disagree with the parts of your post that are grounded in the filings. The Reg A issuance is real, it's a fully sufficient explanation for the price action on its own, and I've said as much in my own posts — the dilution doesn't need a short thesis to explain what we've seen. And the buyback hasn't been verifiably executed. Those are fair points and I'm not going to pretend otherwise.
Where I part company is the jump from those facts to "scam." Scam is a claim about intent, and the chronology you're citing — floated, paused, went quiet — is equally consistent with a much more ordinary story: a company reached for something, counsel told them the version they reached for wouldn't fly, and they went back to the drawing board. That's not me asserting that's what happened — I can't read their intent any more than you can. It's me pointing out that the same observable facts support a good-faith-attempt-that-hit-a-legal-wall reading at least as well as they support a deliberate-fleecing reading. When a single set of facts fits both an innocent and a malicious explanation, calling it a scam isn't a finding — it's a choice of frame.
And going back to the drawing board, if that's what's happening, isn't a scam. It's what companies do when legal says no. My earlier posts on the preferred dividend and the rights offering were aimed at exactly that — here's why the first instrument likely stalled under counsel's eye, and here's a cleaner, executable version of what they appeared to be reaching for. That's the opposite of assuming bad faith.
So to me the open question isn't "scam or not" — that's unprovable from where any of us sit. It's narrower and more interesting: does the intent to execute survive the regroup? If it doesn't, your skeptical read ages well. If it does, then this gets fun for a specific reason.
And here's the part I'd frame honestly as the speculative appeal, clearly labeled as such: a position here is really a bet on two independent axes. One is the ordinary fundamentals-and-execution axis — can a small, thin-margin telecom operation fund its acquisitions cleanly and grow. The other is the experimental axis — if they do execute a capital raise structured to incentivize registered-holder participation, we get a low-cost natural experiment that happens to reveal whether the cross-border short exposure everyone speculates about is actually there. Not because the mechanism is a trap or a squeeze — I've been clear it's a probe, not a squeeze, and that dilution already explains the price without any shorts. But because a holder-level verification channel either surfaces shortfalls or it doesn't, and either answer is informative. You don't usually get to run that experiment for the price of a sub-penny lottery ticket.
So I hold it as a two-layered bet: interesting on the fundamentals, and interesting as a cheap experiment on a question this board has argued about for years. Neither layer requires me to assert the shorts exist — only that the question is open, and that one plausible corporate action would help close it. If you think the regroup reading is wrong, or that execution intent is dead, make that case — that's the actual disagreement worth having.
Krombacher
Bubae
2週前
No one is selling tis trash short. 🙄 It will very likely be dropped to the expert market soon for failure to file their financials which I believe is part of their plan after fleecing shareholders. They promoted at least once nearly every single week while they ran the share count to 8 Billion. Now they have been silent for many months and about to go dark as they convert and distribute their Spectral Capital shares. Raadr Inc still owes three of these individuals around $1.4 million for notes that they wrote themselves shortly after the so called reverse merger. My favorite scam from these guys is detailed in post #48935. It worked brilliantly to generate the liquidity needed for those converting the offering to take around $2 million or so off of retail after months of dilution.
You will likely not get any notice that this will get dropped to the expert market. The 2025 annual revealed that what they sold Spectral Capital in the share exchange agreement is, and has always been, cash flow negative. They do not need someone like me showing up over there with the Q1 2026 with terrible numbers while they are trying to convert their Spectral stock. So I doubt you all see the filing. You will simply find one morning that you are not be able to trade it. Good Luck.
Management Certification April 15, 2026
https://www.otcmarkets.com/file/company/financial-report/551844/content
Bubae
Monday, August 25, 2025 7:56:48 AM
Post# 48935 of 48983
https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=176615239
The company can not hide from what they did. The con to sell 1.3 billion shares of that reg A offering before they filed the Q2 report had two very important parts. The first is that they updated nearly weekly the share structure on the OTC site for months without revealing the ongoing dilution. Post # 48002 shows the near weekly updates since the beginning of the year showing the 25 million shares of the first tranche of the reg A being issued. After that they report zero increases.
The second very important part is the false share buy back narrative. This gave the company a certain air of legitimacy to be able to buy back shares though the business is cash flow negative. This also encourages people to buy the stock, but convincing people hold was key to the price increase. The company then tweets out on the 27th "buyback has started today!". The sales of the reg A began in earnest on that day. Details and links in post# 48921 linked below.
Krombacher
3週前
Refining the rights-offering idea for RDAR — with a correction worth making
I posted earlier about a rights offering as a clean, non-toxic way for RDAR/Telvantis to raise capital. A sharp exchange on a related board sharpened the mechanics, and I want to update this honestly rather than leave an overstatement standing.
The correction first. I'd implied the reconciliation in a rights offering reaches positions in the common stock. It doesn't — the rights reconcile within their own temporary CUSIP, and a broker short on rights simply buys rights to flatten. That mechanism, by itself, doesn't force anything in the underlying shares. Credit to the back-and-forth that clarified it; I'd rather state the plumbing accurately than claim more than it supports.
Where reconciliation actually reaches the holder level is through DRS. When a holder direct-registers shares out of street name, the broker has to deliver real shares from its DTC position to the transfer agent's books for that specific named holder. If it can't source them, the transfer rejects — the documented reason being insufficient book-entry shares. That operates at the individual-holder level, not the net-participant level. I'll be precise and not overclaim: brokers can manage timing through borrowing and netting, so this isn't an instant audit or a forced mass buy-in. It's a voluntary verification channel — any holder who chooses to direct-register confirms their ownership one at a time, and any shortfall surfaces as a reject rather than a confirmation. A probe, not a squeeze.
So a rights offering structured to incentivize registered-holder participation — DRS being a standard, always-available, non-chillable process — is a legitimate capital raise that also gives holders a real, individual way to verify their shares. Not a trap. Not a magic float audit. Exactly what the plumbing supports.
On RDAR specifically, two things make this more than academic. First, the company is actively pursuing acquisitions and an uplisting path — the AmeriCrew agreement and the voice-services sale are on the table. A company doing real deals has a real use for capital raised from its own base. Second, the relevant comparison isn't "rights offering versus a large raise." It's "rights offering versus how OTC companies usually fund themselves" — which is floorless, toxic convertible debt that raises modest sums by handing lenders conversion rights at a discount to a falling price. A fixed-price rights offering to existing holders raises comparable money without the floorless overhang. Small-but-clean beats small-but-toxic, and for a company funding acquisitions rather than just survival, the case is stronger still.
As before: I'm not asserting anything specific about RDAR's share structure. I'm describing a legitimate, executable, shareholder-friendly financing tool — available to a Reg A issuer with the standard Form 1-A qualification step, as precedent like Teton Advisors shows — and being precise about what its mechanics do and don't do.
Sources: DTC Operational Arrangements; DTC ASOP Agent User Guide; STA Profile Direct Registration Processing Guidelines; Regulation A (17 CFR 230.251 et seq.); Teton Advisors Form 1-A.
Krombacher
3週前
A capital-raising tool RDAR can actually execute — and why it works where a preferred dividend stalled
Back in August 2025, the company floated a preferred share dividend. It surfaced, then went quiet — no declaration, no record date. I want to lay out, on-topic and concretely, why a preferred dividend is hard to make work for an OTC issuer, and what the cleaner, executable alternative is. Nothing exotic, nothing outside what a Reg A company can actually do.
First, why the preferred dividend likely stalled. For a dividend to do anything beyond distribute value, the distributed security has to be hard to source synthetically. But any DTC-eligible, fungible preferred gets handled by the settlement system the ordinary way — brokers credit and net it like any other fungible security. To make it non-fungible enough to matter, you'd need a non-DTC or restricted instrument, which an OTC issuer generally can't distribute without risking a DTC chill. That's the box: the version that would matter is the version you can't issue, and the version you can issue doesn't move the needle. Competent counsel would have flagged exactly that — a plausible reason the idea was floated and then paused.
Now the tool that doesn't hit that wall: a rights offering.
A rights offering distributes to shareholders of record the right to buy additional shares, usually at a discount, over a subscription period. Its purpose is raising capital from the existing base rather than through dilutive third-party financing — relevant for any company funding acquisitions and growth cleanly.
The mechanics are where it differs from the dividend. A rights offering is processed through DTC's standard Automated Subscription Offer Program (ASOP), with the transfer agent as subscription agent. When holders exercise, rights are surrendered through DTC — and a broker can only surrender rights it actually holds in its own DTC position. The transfer agent then reconciles total exercises against the finite number of rights issued before releasing new shares.
That reconciliation is routine — every rights offering works this way. But it forces alignment at the surrender step, the one point where a position has to be backed by real rights at DTC. A broker can't exercise more rights than its actual DTC position supports. Whatever a broker's customers believe they hold, the broker can only pass through what it can back, and any shortfall is the broker's to resolve, not the issuer's.
So a rights offering does, through standard accepted mechanics, what the preferred dividend couldn't: it forces reconciliation at a point that can't be papered over, while raising real capital — and without any non-standard instrument that would risk a DTC chill.
On feasibility for a Reg A issuer specifically: this is executable. Reg A companies can and do conduct rights offerings — Teton Advisors, an OTC Reg A issuer, did one with standard DTC/ASOP processing. The one added step versus a fully-reporting company is that RDAR would need to qualify the rights and underlying shares through a new or amended Form 1-A before exercise — a normal SEC qualification process, not a barrier, just a timeline. Already-DTC-eligible common shares otherwise process through ASOP the standard way.
To be precise about what I'm and am not claiming: I'm not asserting anything specific about RDAR's share structure. I'm explaining why one instrument (preferred dividend) is hard to make work for an OTC issuer, why another (rights offering) is both executable and has a useful byproduct that follows from how DTC's ASOP already operates, and what the Reg A path to it looks like. Whether and how to use it is management's call with counsel and the transfer agent.
For a company pursuing acquisitions and growth, a rights offering is a legitimate, shareholder-friendly capital-raising tool — and notably more executable than the preferred dividend floated last year.
Mechanics and precedent are verifiable in public sources: DTC Operational Arrangements, the DTC ASOP Agent User Guide, Regulation A (17 CFR 230.251 et seq.), and the Teton Advisors Form 1-A rights offering.