cottonisking
13時間前
©️®️✅️🔟 How much value, due to inflation, has the $1 bill lost since September 15, 2008?
8 sitesSince September 15, 2008, the $1 bill has lost approximately 34.7% of its purchasing power due to inflation.This means that a $1 bill from the day Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy—marking a pivotal moment in the 2008 financial crisis—buys only about $0.65 worth of goods and services today.Calculating the Loss of ValueInflation calculations are based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).Find the Index Levels:The CPI-U index for September 2008 was 218.783.The latest CPI-U index (May 2026) is 335.123.Compute Total Inflation:Prices have risen by cumulative 53.18% over this 18-year period.\(\text{Cumulative\ Inflation}=\frac{335.123-218.783}{218.783}\times 100=53.18\%\)Determine the Loss in Purchasing Power:Because prices have jumped, the absolute value of that specific $1 bill has shrunken.\(\text{Remaining\ Buying\ Power}=\frac{218.783}{335.123}=65.28\%\)\(\text{Value\ Lost}=100\%-65.28\%=34.72\%\)What This Means in Real TermsTo maintain the exact same standard of living or buying power that $1.00 provided in September 2008, you would need $1.53 today.2008 Value: $1.00Equivalent Value Today: $1.53Real Value Lost: $0.35✅ Final AnswerThe $1 bill has lost 34.72% of its value since September 15, 2008, meaning its real-world purchasing power has declined to roughly 65 cents.If you would like, I can calculate how much value a larger sum of money (like a savings account or salary) has lost over this same period, or show you the yearly average inflation rate across these years. Which would you prefer to explore?Show Code
cottonisking
2日前
🛑 Is this ruling retroactive? Previously, the Second Circuit (which covers New York, where LBHI's bankruptcy is handled) barred the SEC from seeking disgorgement unless it proved quantifiable investor losses. The Supreme Court eradicated this defense, ruling that the remedy focuses entirely on stripping a wrongdoer of ill-gotten net profits rather than compensating for a victim's out-of-pocket loss.How the Ruling Impacts Bankruptcy Cases and LBHIWhile the Sripetch case involved penny stock fraud, its legal precedent shifts the dynamics inside high-stakes bankruptcy courtrooms, including the ongoing LBHI liquidation trust:Lower Burden for Government Claims: In corporate liquidations, calculating exact "investor loss" for specific market maneuvers or disclosure violations can be nearly impossible. The SEC can now pursue massive disgorgement claims against bankrupt entities or their executives solely by proving they obtained "unjust enrichment" or violated a legally protected interest.Dilution of the Second Circuit Defense: Historically, estate lawyers in New York bankruptcy courts utilized strict Second Circuit limits to drastically shrink or block SEC claims to maximize payouts for unsecured creditors. +9 Supreme Court rulings on civil remedies generally apply retroactively to all pending cases and open matters, including the ongoing LBHI liquidation trust. Because the Court ruled in Sripetch v. SEC that disgorgement focuses on a wrongdoer’s unjust enrichment rather than the victim’s financial loss, it eliminates the Second Circuit's strict "investor loss" defense entirely.Retroactivity and Pending ClaimsAs a standard rule of appellate procedure, the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law applies to all cases that are still open on direct review. This means the SEC can apply this precedent retroactively to active claims and ongoing settlements in the LBHI bankruptcy. Estate lawyers defending LBHI and its executives can no longer rely on the overturned SEC v. Govil precedent to dismiss SEC disgorgement claims for lack of proven out-of-pocket investor loss.Strategic Impact on LBHIWhile the Sripetch ruling is a major victory for government claims in the Second Circuit, it does not mean the SEC can arbitrarily demand limitless sums. The Court's decision was deliberately narrow, meaning defendants still retain important legal arguments to limit SEC disgorgement in the LBHI trust:Net Profits Limitation: Disgorgement is strictly limited to net profits causally connected to the violation. It cannot be based on gross revenues or legitimate gains independent of the unlawful conduct.Seventh Amendment Jury Rights: Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence in Sripetch argued that SEC disgorgement now triggers a defendant's right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. This provides a strong procedural avenue for defendants to challenge the SEC's claims in court.If you are following this case, I can help you:Summarize specific case opinionsOutline the Seventh Amendment jury argumentsDraft a preliminary analysis of the LBHI trust's liability exposureLet me know how you would like to proceed
cottonisking
2日前
Major Factor: Previously, the Second Circuit (which covers New York, where LBHI's bankruptcy is handled) barred the SEC from seeking disgorgement unless it proved quantifiable investor losses. The Supreme Court eradicated this defense, ruling that the remedy focuses entirely on stripping a wrongdoer of ill-gotten net profits rather than compensating for a victim's out-of-pocket loss.How the Ruling Impacts Bankruptcy Cases and LBHIWhile the Sripetch case involved penny stock fraud, its legal precedent shifts the dynamics inside high-stakes bankruptcy courtrooms, including the ongoing LBHI liquidation trust:Lower Burden for Government Claims: In corporate liquidations, calculating exact "investor loss" for specific market maneuvers or disclosure violations can be nearly impossible. The SEC can now pursue massive disgorgement claims against bankrupt entities or their executives solely by proving they obtained "unjust enrichment" or violated a legally protected interest.Dilution of the Second Circuit Defense: Historically, estate lawyers in New York bankruptcy courts utilized strict Second Circuit limits to drastically shrink or block SEC claims to maximize payouts for unsecured creditors.
fritz603
2日前
Post 114463 from GreatFinancialCosplay08, September 06, 2025
If Lehman Brothers was not in Chapter 11 and had the kind of quarterly earnings for 13 years in a row despite being under a choke of Conservatorship I would never buy any of their PFD shares. Not ever TruPS. I'd be buying $LEH common stock.
This situation is unique. If that guy was buying PFD shs of any kind in the LBHI CH 11 (or claims since there's only the TruPS available to Canadian brokerages over OTC Markets Group Expert Market and the brokers in the US are purposely colluding to not allow any -Q stock purchases by any customers since 2021- so you gotta go thru Canada if you find a friend or w/e) - then buying any claims to PFD shares in LBHI's CH 11 would make sense. Because as you've noticed the docket doesn't lie. Congruent Funding, LLC is Farallon Capital management, LLC's arm and they are the ones buying up these claims over and over and over and prior to that post-POTUS #47's Nov 5 election the only bank besides Barclays, Bank of America, who looked into the entire books of LBHI on Lehman Weekend 2008 (sep 12-13) decided not only to begin filing their own billions of 3001 spending on claims in the CH 11 docket - they even made their first 3001 buy including as far up as Class 9A claims on Dec 12, 2024 but waited until the end of May 2025 to file it.
The point is - this is because of something that goes deep - and I will publish my data and work on it to share at some point that anyone who has info on what Bank of America (or Barclays) saw inside those books before the bankruptcy IS THE SOLE reason the Trump election has these institutions buying billions and billions of claims for the reasons I've been able to figure out since I've seen since a professor at a West Coast "Ivy League" institution made a repository of internals from those books released from court proceedings of the LBHI saga along with Valukis material have been hosted at that university since 2011-2013.
The guys who come here from the FNMA FMCC IHub and X social spam mob with all their wasted words to claim "JPS" superiority and FNMA FMCC (commons) are trash are the same people who would come over here with no idea what a TruPS is (high ranked that the perp PFD and commons in LBHI CH 11 pecking order btw) - let alone they are hybrids and not exactly "PFD" in the trad sense at all.
Finally here's the easiest way to ignore those people: LBHI is going to come out of CH 11 paying off every last claim even down to the last common shareholder in Class 12 (via the Plan Trust share %) and have tens of billions in cash to distribute for suspended quarterly cash distributions the moment CH 11 is closed because LBHI can then send $ -> Property Trustee at Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. where the four DST entities accounts are managed and that ongoing bank trust services handling the four different TruPS shareholders cash distributions pass it on thru DTCC to the brokerage account you hold your shares in.
Also they have a good 30+ years left of maturity to pass on money to TruPS holders and I suspect either they will offer a deal to pay TruPS to consider ending that early - OR some institution (Perhaps Deutsche Bank as they want to expand in Inv Banking in the US this year) or even Barclays CIB want to acquire the Tier1 capital for their own operations and we end up with our servicing of these under their institution. All they have to do is buy the 100% ownership of all four DST's LBHI has via commons that are worth 3% of each specific DST's total TruPS.
Hope that makes sense.
Keep your head up ignore losers. They aren't even worth countersuits for them trying to sensor our first amendment rights to tell the honest truth here. (true story)
indepth05
2日前
Connecting dots, & digging deeper…
One of the more intriguing pieces of the Lehman puzzle is Claim #58233, a claim with a face amount of approximately $1.923 billion.
For years, the claim was held by Deutsche Bank. The story became more interesting when court filings from the Deutsche Bank and Finepoint Capital dispute revealed that participation interests in substantially all of Claim #58233 had been sold to investors. While Deutsche Bank remained the record holder, sophisticated distressed-debt investors had already acquired economic exposure to the claim, with Finepoint becoming involved through those arrangements.
https://fxnewsgroup.com/forex-news/institutional/deutsche-bank-sues-finepoint-capital-for-claims-against-lehman-brothers-bankruptcy-estate/
The claim continued to trade long after many assumed the Lehman case was nearing its end. In 2021, Stonehill acquired approximately $43.7 million of Claim #58233 through a court-filed transfer. Two years later, in 2023, Stonehill acquired an additional $132.1 million portion of the same claim.
https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4049448&projectCode=LBH&source=DM&utm
https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4184836&projectCode=LBH&source=DM&utm
These were not insignificant transactions and demonstrated that institutional investors were still actively seeking exposure to Claim #58233 more than a decade after Lehman’s collapse.
Then came another notable development. In February2026, Deutsche Bank executed a transfer of Claim #58233, and in March 2026 the transfer was filed showing Congruent Funding LLC, a Farallon-managed vehicle, as the new owner of the claim with a stated face amount of approximately $1.923 billion.
https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4561986&projectCode=LBH&source=DM
Viewed as a timeline, Claim #58233 appears to have moved through a remarkable chain of sophisticated market participants: Deutsche Bank as the long-time holder, Finepoint becoming involved through disputes over participation interests, Stonehill acquiring portions of the claim in both 2021 and 2023, and Farallon ultimately stepping in through Congruent Funding LLC in 2026.
The question is; Nearly eighteen years after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, why did one of the estate’s largest claims continue to attract the attention of Deutsche Bank, Finepoint, Stonehill, and Farallon?
Whatever the answer may be, Claim #58233 has remained active, traded, litigated, and valuable enough to keep some of the most sophisticated distressed-debt investors in the world interested long after many believed the Lehman story was finished.
cottonisking
2日前
⏰️🐎🐎🐎 How has a recent Supreme Court ruling shifted SEC disgorgement powers in a bankruptcy case? The June 2026 Supreme Court ruling as it relates to LBHI's bankruptcy.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not rule on a case combining both Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disgorgement powers and the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) bankruptcy. However, the landmark June 4, 2026 Supreme Court ruling in Sripetch v. SEC fundamentally expanded the SEC's nationwide enforcement and disgorgement toolkit.By extension, this ruling directly influences how the SEC can assert monetary claims against corporate debtors, liquidating trusts, or bad actors involved in complex wind-downs like the historic LBHI chapter 11 estate.The Core Ruling: Sripetch v. SECIn a 9-0 unanimous decision penned by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held that the SEC does not need to prove that investors suffered any financial (pecuniary) loss to obtain a disgorgement order.The Court resolved a sharp circuit split. Previously, the Second Circuit (which covers New York, where LBHI's bankruptcy is handled) barred the SEC from seeking disgorgement unless it proved quantifiable investor losses. The Supreme Court eradicated this defense, ruling that the remedy focuses entirely on stripping a wrongdoer of ill-gotten net profits rather than compensating for a victim's out-of-pocket loss.How the Ruling Impacts Bankruptcy Cases and LBHIWhile the Sripetch case involved penny stock fraud, its legal precedent shifts the dynamics inside high-stakes bankruptcy courtrooms, including the ongoing LBHI liquidation trust:Lower Burden for Government Claims: In corporate liquidations, calculating exact "investor loss" for specific market maneuvers or disclosure violations can be nearly impossible. The SEC can now pursue massive disgorgement claims against bankrupt entities or their executives solely by proving they obtained "unjust enrichment" or violated a legally protected interest.Dilution of the Second Circuit Defense: Historically, estate lawyers in New York bankruptcy courts utilized strict Second Circuit limits to drastically shrink or block SEC claims to maximize payouts for unsecured creditors. Sripetch completely removes this shield.Competition with Creditors: Because the SEC can more easily solidify its disgorgement claims without mapping out exact individual losses, the agency positions itself as a formidable claimant against a debtor's remaining pool of assets. This could potentially reduce the assets available to other general unsecured creditors waiting on final distributions.Meaningful Defenses PreservedDespite the SEC's sweeping victory, the Supreme Court left several key parameters from its 2020 Liu v. SEC decision intact, giving bankruptcy estates a remaining blueprint to fight the dollar amounts:Net Profits Only: Disgorgement must strictly be calculated from net profits, allowing estates to deduct legitimate business expenses to reduce the claim.Causation: The SEC must still prove that the profits were directly and causally connected to the specific legal violation.A Looming Shift: The Right to a Jury TrialJustice Clarence Thomas filed a solo concurrence that bankruptcy and corporate defense attorneys are watching closely. He argued that because Congress codified disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7), it has effectively transformed into a legal remedy rather than an equitable one. In future litigation, this could grant defendants a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, potentially altering how regulatory fraud claims are adjudicated in both federal and bankruptcy courts.If you are looking at a specific claim or asset allocation within the LBHI liquidation, let me know. I can detail how the SEC's claim ranking compares to general unsecured creditors, or outline the current timeline for Lehman's remaining asset distributions.AI responses may include mistakes. For legal advice, consult a professional. Learn more
fritz603
2日前
sorry, it was the wrong webpage. correct is
Congruent Funding, LLC $1,923,495,506
c/o Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C.
One Maritime Plaza, Suite 2100
San Francisco, CA 94111
https://www.faralloncapital.com/about-us---2025-1
fritz603
2日前
https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4583025&projectCode=LBH&source=DM
Ref. Docket Nos. 61891, 61893, & 61898
Doc 61893
https://document.epiq11.com/document/getdocumentbycode?docId=4561986&projectCode=LBH&source=DM
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, LONDON BRANCH (“Seller”) does hereby unconditionally and irrevocably sell, transfer and assign unto CONGRUENT FUNDING, LLC (“Buyer”) all rights, title and interest in and to the claims of Seller referenced as proof of claim number 58233 in the principal amount of $1,923,495,506 (the “Claim”) against Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
https://congruentinv.com/about-2/
CONGRUENT STRATEGIES
Acquisitions
Congruent acquires majority control of companies for the following:
Recapitalizations
Growth capital initiatives
Add-on acquisitions
Management buyouts (MBOs)
Partner buyouts
Estate planning
Ownership succession
Management succession
Transformative growth initiatives
Balance sheet reorganization
cottonisking
3日前
🐎🐎🐎 How has recent Supreme Court rulings shifted SEC disgorgement powers in a bankruptcy case? June 2026 Supreme Court ruling...
11 sitesIn the unanimous June 4, 2026 ruling Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court broadened the SEC's enforcement toolkit by deciding that the agency does not need to prove that investors suffered pecuniary (financial) loss to obtain a disgorgement order. While the case itself stems from civil securities fraud rather than an active bankruptcy proceeding, this expansion of power directly shifts how SEC disgorgement claims will operate alongside or inside a bankruptcy case.The ruling impacts the legal landscape in the following key ways:1. Elimination of the "No Harm, No Disgorgement" DefenseThe Ruling: Written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court resolved a circuit split by holding that a "victim" status under traditional equity requires only that a defendant interfered with an investor's legally protected interests.The Measure: The Court affirmed that disgorgement is measured by the wrongdoer's net illicit gains, not by the victim's out-of-pocket financial harm.Bankruptcy Impact: Fraudulent actors or corporate debtors can no longer argue in court that they shouldn't face SEC disgorgement because their complex schemes or structural collapses left no clearly quantifiable investor losses. The full value of the illicit profits remains on the table.2. Broadened Claims Against Bankruptcy EstatesHigher Claims In Bankruptcy: Because the SEC no longer faces the high hurdle of totaling up explicit individual financial losses to win a disgorgement order, it can secure massive disgorgement claims much faster.Competition with Creditors: If a fraudulent entity or individual enters bankruptcy, the SEC can present a finalized, robust disgorgement claim. This injects a substantial government-backed claim into the bankruptcy estate, heavily shifting the pool of assets available and directly competing with other unsecured creditors for distribution.3. Lingering Unresolved Questions for Bankruptcy CourtsWhile the SEC won a major victory, Sripetch left open several critical questions that bankruptcy judges will now have to navigate:The Distribution Issue: Under the landmark 2020 Liu v. SEC decision, equitable disgorgement had to be "awarded for victims." The Sripetch Court declined to decide whether newer statutory revisions (15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7)) allow the SEC to skip victim distribution and drop the money directly into the U.S. Treasury. In a bankruptcy case, if the SEC cannot identify or feasibly distribute funds to specific victims, debtor estates may still challenge the legitimacy of the SEC's claim.The Jury Trial Threat: In a notable solo concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Congress's statutory updates have transformed disgorgement into a "legal remedy" (a penalty/fine) rather than an equitable one. He signaled that under the SEC v. Jarkesy (2024) precedent, defendants should have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. If future litigation adopts this view, it will heavily disrupt how quickly the SEC can liquidate its claims before a bankruptcy distribution takes place.
Westlaw Today
+1
Case Study: In re Wyly (U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas)
In September 2014, a New York federal court ordered the Wyly brothers to pay a record $187 million in disgorgement plus $112 million in prejudgment interest—totaling nearly $300 million—following a high-profile SEC civil fraud action regarding hidden offshore trusts. Days after the judgment, Samuel Wyly and his brother's widow filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Texas to preserve their remaining assets.
FindLaw Caselaw
+2
This case perfectly demonstrates the friction and functional independence between the two legal frameworks:
1. Enforcing Police and Regulatory Powers
When the debtors attempted to use the bankruptcy court's standard Section 362 automatic stay to halt the SEC’s active litigation, the court ruled against them. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), governmental units are exempt from the automatic stay when executing their "police and regulatory powers".
Westlaw Today
The Takeaway: The bankruptcy judge could not interfere with or delay the SEC's independent legal timeline to solidify and amend its fraud claims.
Westlaw Today
+1
2. Independent Liquidation Timelines
The SEC's primary objective in seeking disgorgement is to strip the wrongdoer of unjust enrichment, an equitable goal entirely detached from a standard creditor's intent to recover a basic pro-rata share of a debtor's estate.
Business Valuation Resources
+2
The Takeaway: While private creditors were bound to the rigid Chapter 11 reorganization schedules, the district court supervising the SEC action continued to move forward, freezing assets and reviewing alternative disgorgement calculation methodologies completely independently of the bankruptcy track.
Business Valuation Resources
+1
3. The "Fair Fund" Asset Allocation Conflict
The structural overlap occurs because bankruptcy seeks to pool all assets for an equitable distribution to standard creditors, whereas the SEC targets specific ill-gotten gains to divert into a Fair Fund to directly compensate defrauded investors. In the Wyly case:
Wikipedia
The SEC litigated precisely to prove that the funds in question represented unpaid taxes and hidden securities profits.
Because these funds represent illegally obtained assets, they technically do not belong to the debtor's estate, allowing the SEC to bypass standard bankruptcy distribution logic to establish their victim-centric recovery mechanisms.
Business Valuation Resources
+2
If you want to look closer at how regulatory fines interact with insolvency, I can break down how bankruptcy courts rank SEC claims compared to regular creditors, or look at how recent Supreme Court rulings have shifted SEC disgorgement powers. Which direction would you like to explore?
AI responses may include mistakes. For legal advice, consult a professional. Learn more
stoxjock
5日前
Cotton, This is all good and Thanks for Sharing this here...
But, How/Why will this 'Materially' Impact any *New* "Recoveries" for LBHI?
I still can't fathom how LBHI had to file for a Bankruptcy with over $1 Trillion, and 'ended up' with ;recovering like around $140B of those "Assets"...
Obviously whoever LBHI was lending to/Acquired those" Assets' on its books Either "highly Inflated" the Value of those Assets OR they Plain and Simple "STOLE" those Assets from LBHI...Even Other "Investment Banks" seem to have done this from LBHI , All with Active-Connivance & "Blessings" of the US FED & US Treasury, Courtesy pf Paul "Hanky-Panky' Paulson Scoundrel & Jamie Dimon, both of who wanted LBHI "DEAD" , so that they can "Pick Up' all of Lehman Brothers' "Massive Book of the Investment Banking Business! It was so sickening how they 'deliberately' 'forced' LBHI into Bankruptcy, so that they could save GS, MS, JPMC and Even Sent out nearly $60 BILLION EACH , of US Tax Payer money to Duetsche Bank, Credit Suisse & Society Generale.
With all that History "Water Under the Bridge" now, how will this Supreme Court Ruling, which, as Usual seems to have come Way Late, like some 20 years after biggest Financial Frauds were committed in the US, help LBHI recover any money from any of the 'Fraudsters' who stole from LBHI?
cottonisking
5日前
This Supreme Court ruling is a major victory for the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission). Essentially, it means the SEC can still force fraudsters to give back their illegal profits, even if they can't prove a specific investor lost money.
Here is a breakdown of what this means, why it matters, and the logic the Court used.
The Core Issue: No Harm, No Foul?
Before this ruling, defendants in financial fraud cases often argued a loophole: "Sure, I broke the rules and made millions, but you can't prove any specific investor actually lost money because of it. Therefore, you can't make me give the money back." The Supreme Court completely rejected that logic.
Key Takeaways from the Ruling
Defining the "Victim": Justice Neil Gorsuch clarified that an investor can still be a "victim" of fraud even if there isn't a direct, measurable financial loss (pecuniary loss). If a company cheats the system, the integrity of the market is harmed, and the investors were still wronged.
Disgorgement Power: The legal term for forcing someone to give up illegally gained profits is disgorgement. The Court affirmed that the SEC's power to demand disgorgement is about stripping the wrongdoer of their ill-gotten gains, not just balancing the ledger for specific losses.
Unanimous Agreement: The fact that the decision was unanimous (9-0) is significant. It shows that both the conservative and liberal justices agree that financial regulators need this tool to keep the markets honest.
Why This Matters
If the Court had ruled the other way, it would have crippled the SEC’s ability to police Wall Street, especially in complex cases like insider trading or penny-stock schemes.
In many insider trading cases, for example, someone trades on secret information and makes millions. It is incredibly difficult to point to a specific everyday investor and prove they lost a dollar because of that specific secret trade. Under the old defense argument, the fraudster might have kept the money. Now, the SEC can safely claw those illegal profits back.
In short: The ruling ensures that in the financial world, crime doesn't pay—even if the victims didn't realize they were being cheated at the time.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/04/us/politics/supreme-court-sec-disgorgement.html
indepth05
2週前
Occam’s Razor cuts both ways. We are not pumping anything since few can buy shares, we are simply saying that selling for $0.001 guarantees almost nothing, while holding until the estate closes at least preserves the possibility of something and find out whether there’s residual value
Meanwhile, I’ve shared filings, legal developments, distributions, and multiple recovery scenarios—including reasons why recovery may fail. That’s called research.
You sold long ago and have been posting the same “zip, zilch, nada” forecast ever since, usually without bringing any new information to the table.
One of us is discussing evidence. The other is running a broken alarm clock that only knows one time.If recovery is truly impossible, reality will settle the debate at closure. Until then, repeating “zero” a thousand times isn’t analysis—it’s just a sound effect.Go figure!
stoxjock
2週前
EXACTLY....Says It ALL...
Aug 17th can't Come SOON ENOUGH!
"Code”) for an order (a) approving the population of Eligible Creditors to participate in, and the
procedures for, the Final Distribution; (b) approving the form of the Final Distribution Notice,
attached hereto as Exhibit 1; (c) approving the form of the Opt Out Form, attached hereto as
Exhibit 1-A; (d) approving the form of the Non-Eligible Creditors Notice, attached hereto as
Exhibit 2;"
Read the Above AGAIN...
We. Plan Trust Holders, got the Order "approving the population of Eligible Creditors to participate in, and theprocedures for, the Final Distribution;
And Let that SINK IN To ALL BOZO Clowns LIke BREAKER***
GLTA LBHI CT & Securities Holders!!!
stoxjock
2週前
"Code”) for an order (a) approving the population of Eligible Creditors to participate in, and the
procedures for, the Final Distribution; (b) approving the form of the Final Distribution Notice,
attached hereto as Exhibit 1; (c) approving the form of the Opt Out Form, attached hereto as
Exhibit 1-A; (d) approving the form of the Non-Eligible Creditors Notice, attached hereto as
Exhibit 2;"
EXACTLY....Says It ALL...
Aug 17th can't Come SOON ENOUGH!
BOZOS like BREAKER will NEVER Get This because simply put "They Are NOT Getting What they are NOT Getting"!
TIA & GLTU & GLTA LBHI Securities Holders!
cottonisking
2週前
WEIL:\97962980\14\58399.0011
-------------------------------------------------------------------x
:
In re : Chapter 11 Case No.
:
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et al., : 08-13555 (SCC)
:
Debtors. : (Jointly Administered)
:
-------------------------------------------------------------------x
ORDER AUTHORIZING FINAL DISTRIBUTION FOR CERTAIN CREDITORS
OF LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC. AND GRANTING RELATED RELIEF
Upon the motion (the “Motion”),1
dated May 28, 2021 of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”), as Plan Administrator under the Modified Third Amended Joint
Chapter 11 Plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors (the “Plan”),
pursuant to sections 105(a) and 1142(b) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy
Code”) for an order (a) approving the population of Eligible Creditors to participate in, and the
procedures for, the Final Distribution; (b) approving the form of the Final Distribution Notice,
attached hereto as Exhibit 1; (c) approving the form of the Opt Out Form, attached hereto as
Exhibit 1-A; (d) approving the form of the Non-Eligible Creditors Notice, attached hereto as
Exhibit 2; (e) approving the form of the Opt In Form, attached hereto as Exhibit 2-A; and
(f) authorizing the Plan Administrator to effectuate, cancel, or delay the Final Distribution in the
Plan Administrator’s sole discretion, all as more fully described in the Motion; and upon
consideration of the Kolev Declaration; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion
and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Amended
Standing Order of Reference M-431, dated January 31, 2012 (Preska, C.J.); and consideration of
the Motion and the relief requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b); and venue being proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and
1
Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Motion.
08-13555-scc Doc 61161 Filed 07/01/21 Entered 07/01/21 09:59:10 Main Document
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