Bourque Industries Inc (EM)【BORK】株式ニュース

This is as of 2/25/25 looks as if he's getting off. Something he hasn't done in a while

AARON M. MCKOWN
aaron@mckownbailey.com
WILLIAM P. CASSIDY, JR.
wcassidy@mckownbailey.com
McKown Bailey
520 Newport Center Drive, Suite 470
Newport Beach, CA 92660
Telephone: 949-858-3200
Attorneys for Defendants
Redstone Advisory Trust,
Aaron M. McKown, P.A., and
Aaron M. McKown
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BOSS CONSULTING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TERMINATOR ARMOR, INC., an
Arizona corporation; BOURQUE
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Nevada
corporation; JOHN M. BOURQUE, an
individual; CAROL J. CONDON, an
individual, REDSTONE INVESTMENT
GROUP, LLC, an entity; AARON M.
MCKOWN, an individual; AARON M.
MCKOWN, P.A., an entity; and
OHANA CAPITAL FINANCIAL, an
entity,
Defendants.
Case No.: 8:20-cv-01897-MEMF-KES
Hon. Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO AMEND SCHEDULING
ORDER DUE TO TRIAL CONFLICT
Hearing Date: March 27, 2025
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
Courtroom: 8B
REDSTONE ADVISORY TRUST, a
Texas Trust; and AARON M.
MCKOWN P.A., a Florida Corporation,
Cross-claimants,
v.
TERMINATOR ARMOR, INC., an
Arizona Corporation; BOURQUE
INDUSTRIES, INC., a Nevada
Corporation; JOHN M. BOURQUE, an
individual; CAROL J. CONDON, an
Case 8:20-cv-01897-MEMF-KES Document 172-1 Filed 02/20/25 Page 1 of 5 Page
ID #:1092
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
individual; OHANA CAPITAL
FINANCIAL, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Cross-Defendants.
REDSTONE ADVISORY TRUST, a
Texas Trust; and AARON M.
MCKOWN P.A., a Florida Corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
KRYON CORPORATION, an Arizona
Corporation; BOURQUE SUB 3, INC.,
an Arizona corporation; ROBERT
KILLION, an individual; TRILITHON
SANITATION, INC., a Utah
corporation; SEMISI “JAMES” NIU aka
JOHN TAUFA aka SIONE TAUFA, an
individual; JAMES EVANS, an
individual; HIGHRHEALTH, LLC, a
Louisiana limited liability company; and
LONNA HEGGELUND, an individual.
Third-Party Defendants.
Case 8:20-cv-01897-MEMF-KES Document 172-1 Filed 02/20/25 Page 2 of 5 Page
ID #:1093
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Redstone
Advisory Trust (erroneously sued as Redstone Investment Group, LLC), Aaron M.
McKown, and Aaron M. McKown P.A. (the “Motion”) came for hearing on March 27,
2025 at 10:00 a.m. in the Courtroom 8B of United States District Court for the Central
District of California, the Honorable Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong presiding.
Upon the consideration of Moving Parties’ Motion, and other parties’ responsive
pleadings (if any) thereto, the Court finds as follows:
1. The Motion is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Boss Consulting, Inc.’s first cause of action for breach of contract
against Defendants Redstone Advisory Trust (erroneously sued as
Redstone Investment Group, LLC), Aaron M. McKown, and Aaron M.
McKown P.A. is dismissed without leave to amend.
3. Under California law, only a party to a contract may be liable for breach
of contract unless the non-contracting party expressly assumed the
agreement. See Clemens v. Am. Warranty Corp., 193 Cal.App.3d 444, 452
(1987); see also Gold v. Gibbons, 178 Cal.App.2d 517, 519 (1960)
(“Breach of contract cannot be made the basis of an action for damages
against defendants who did not execute it,” unless the non-party has
expressly assumed the contract). Merely because a party assisted in some
regard or accepted the benefits of the contract does not bind the party to its
terms. See Matthau v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.4th 593, 603 (2007)
(refusing to bind a non-party to a contract merely because it benefitted or
assisted in performance, finding the proposition “unsupported by
law”). Plaintiff does not allege that either of the McKown Defendants was
a party to the contract nor does Plaintiff allege that either of the McKown
Parties assumed the contract. Rather, Plaintiff expressly alleges that it
contracted with Terminator through Redstone. These admissions entitle
the McKown Parties to judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
Case 8:20-cv-01897-MEMF-KES Document 172-1 Filed 02/20/25 Page 3 of 5 Page
ID #:1094
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[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
4. The same is true with respect to Redstone. While Redstone is alleged to
have entered the agreement with Plaintiff, Plaintiff judicially admits facts
that demonstrate it contracted with Defendant Terminator Armor, Inc.
(“Terminator”) for the goods at issue. For example, Plaintiff admits that it
timely accepted the contract by wiring the purchase price for the goods ($2
million) to Terminator and that it separately paid Redstone a commission.
Plaintiff further admits that Terminator delivered the goods in California
for Plaintiff’s inspection, Plaintiff inspected the goods, and the goods were
then shipped by Terminator to Plaintiff’s buyer in Arkansas. Plaintiff
alleges that after its buyer rejected the goods, Plaintiff demanded a return
of payment from Terminator, not Redstone. These facts conclusively
acknowledge that the contract was between Plaintiff and Terminator. At
best, Redstone was nothing more than an agent of a disclosed principal –
a principal that Plaintiff admits had been disclosed prior to Plaintiff’s
acceptance of the contract. Thus, under California law, Redstone cannot
be held liable for Terminator’s alleged breach. Dones v. Life Insurance
Co. of North America, 55 Cal.App.5th 665, 689 (2020) (“[A]n agent is
ordinarily not liable on the contract when he acts on behalf of a disclosed
principal.” (quoting Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 929
(1980))).
5. Each of the Defendants are separately entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s
first cause of action for breach of contract as a result of Plaintiff’s judicial
admissions that it inspected the goods, that during the inspection it
conclusively determined that the goods were non-conforming because they
were counterfeit, and that despite this discovery, Plaintiff did not reject the
goods. Instead, the goods were then shipped to Plaintiff’s buyer in
Arkansas and that only after Plaintiff’s buyer rejected the goods did
Plaintiff attempt to revoke its acceptance. California’s Commerci