FINSIGHT Group Inc ("FINSIGHT"), a New York City based financial
technology provider that beneficially owns over 2 million or
approximately 5.6% of Q4’s outstanding shares and represents
approximately 8.9% of the non-rolling shareholders, today issued a
letter to its fellow Q4 Inc (TSE: QFOR) (“Q4” or the “Company”)
shareholders to join FINSIGHT in voting
AGAINST
the Company’s proposed plan of arrangement to be acquired by Sumeru
Equity Partners (“Sumeru”) (the “Arrangement”) at a special meeting
of Q4 shareholders ("Special Meeting") currently scheduled for
January 24, 2024. (All amounts in USD unless otherwise specified).
The full text of the letter follows:
January 17, 2024
Dear Fellow Shareholders:
By now, we hope you have reviewed our December 28, 2023 letter
to the Q4 board of directors (the “Board”) and our January 12, 2024
press release that methodically outlined the key events and details
that we believe demonstrate that the proposed Arrangement is a
conflicted, premature and opportunistic transfer of value from the
Company’s non-rolling shareholders (“Non-Rolling Shareholders”),
who collectively own 63% of the shares outstanding, to the private
equity investors, senior management, and other insiders (“Rolling
Shareholders”) who collectively own 37% of the shares
outstanding.
The Special Committee of the Board (the “Special Committee”)
subsequently responded to our press release, in a letter dated
January 15, 2024, to attempt to convince shareholders that
FINSIGHT’s concerns about the conflicted and flawed process, the
low valuation, opportunistic timing, and the lack of detail or
consideration paid to the standalone option, were misplaced.
In this letter, FINSIGHT seeks to reiterate our position and
analysis, and address some of the assertions made by the Special
Committee:I. In their January 15, 2024, letter, the Special
Committee repeated its claim that it ran a robust process.
Shareholders that have not yet read our January 12, 2024, press
release, or Q4’s Management Information Circular (the “MIC”), are
invited to review pages 30-33 of the MIC. FINSIGHT believes the
following key facts are straightforward and demonstrate that the
Special Committee’s claims are false:
- Ten Coves and senior management determined from the outset
(June 2023) that it would only entertain offers that enabled Ten
Coves to roll. We believe Ten Coves knew that this self-serving
structural impediment would significantly impair the universe of
strategics and sponsors willing to acquire the Company (many of
whom would prefer a clean capital structure or fulsome acquisition)
and it was a key motive driving the lack of buyer outreach.
- On July 4, Sumeru executed an NDA. Eight days later, on July
12, the Special Committee “determined that it would engage in a
preliminary price exploration exercise with the Potential
Counterparties… and defer any formal sale process until an
indication of interest had been received from at least one.” Here,
the Special Committee established a clear criterion to initiate a
“formal sale process.”
- On July 26, Sumeru submitted a non-binding indication of
interest. Yet, nine days later, on August 4, the Special Committee
“noted the Board’s views on the need for certainty to secure an
offer within an acceptable range and the risk of one of more
Potential Counterparties withdrawing its proposal as a result of
the Company commencing a broader sale process.”
Fellow shareholders, the above events and quotes are drawn
directly from the Company’s MIC. We believe the Special Committee
understood and more importantly, acknowledged that they were not
engaging in a “formal sale process” by relying solely on
indications of three of the four inbound sponsors and that the
process therefore cannot meet the standard of being “robust.”
Moreover, the Special Committee refused to address or explain why
Sumeru was given over 60 days after submitting its $6.05 offer to
negotiate terms acceptable specifically to Ten Coves, while the
entirety of the go-shop period was merely 35 days. If Sumeru needed
120 days to diligence and negotiate an agreement acceptable to Ten
Coves, we are skeptical that the Special Committee believed, in
good faith, that other bidders could do it in a quarter of the
time.
II. In its January 15, 2024, letter, the Special
Committee claimed: “Q4’s revenues are highly dependent on initial
public offering volume” and that “[b]efore its IPO, Q4 was able to
grow by more than 30% annually; half of this growth was through
acquisitions. Absent this M&A, Q4’s prospects of growth are
materially impaired.”
This is nonsensical and disingenuous. At what point were IPO
investors and shareholders told they were investing in an
acquisition vehicle rather than a pre-eminent software solutions
provider for public companies? The Company itself doesn’t believe
this, as evidenced by the over $35 million it spent on sales and
marketing since its IPO and by the investor presentation currently
posted to Q4’s website, that claims it has penetrated just 6% of
corporate issuers (who pay most of its fees) and estimates the
total addressable market for its services to be $20 billion1.
Further highlighting the fallacy of the Special Committee’s
statement, below are excerpts taken verbatim from page 39 of Q4’s
October 22, 2021, IPO prospectus:
- “We believe that any public company can benefit from
subscribing to the Q4 platform. We estimate that there are
approximately 41,500 public companies globally1 and, based on the
annual price point of our complete corporate platform, we believe
this represents a global market opportunity of approximately US$13
billion annually.”
- “We currently offer certain products in our platform for the
sell-side to facilitate the functions of their corporate access
teams, including virtual conferencing services, with near-term
plans to expand to deal management and research services. We
believe that there is a significant need in the global market for
these services as we estimate there are approximately 8,000
sell-side firms2, approximately 1,000 annual sell-side investor
conferences and approximately 24,000 public offerings1 annually.
Based on the cost of our solutions and what we believe the market
price is for our upcoming sell-side focused products, we believe
the global sell-side opportunity represents an annual market of
approximately US$5 billion.”
- “We also sell access to our platform to the buy-side and, in
the near-term, plan to add additional products to our platform
focused on the buy-side, including virtual meeting management and
research services. Globally, there are approximately 25,000
buy-side firms2 and, based on the average cost of our buy-side
focused solutions, we estimate a global buy-side market opportunity
of approximately US$2 billion annually.”
Fellow shareholders, the Special Committee is either purposely
misleading Non-Rolling Shareholders or lacks a fundamental
understanding of Q4’s business. Neither are acceptable positions
for the directors who purportedly represented the interests of
Non-Rolling Shareholders in these negotiations.
III. We are confident that in the event Non-Rolling
Shareholders defeat the Arrangement, the Q4 Board and management
team will heed the will of shareholders, take action on our
recommendations and execute a comprehensive repositioning of
Q4.
We have confidence that with the right priorities and
accountability in place, Q4 management can drive substantial medium
and long-term shareholder value as a standalone public company.
With the recent restructuring complete, we reiterate that Q4
management should refocus the Company on organic growth. As
articulated in our January 12, 2024, press release, FINSIGHT
believes that Q4 can take several steps to catalyze its business,
accelerate growth, and unlock immediate value for all
shareholders:
- Focus on driving free cashflow by further rationalizing
SG&A and reducing R&D, which we believe would instantly be
accretive to its valuation. Given the business is near break-even,
returning SG&A and R&D to be in line with 2020 levels could
generate over $20 million in EBITDA in 2024. Today, the Company
supports less than 12% more customers than it did in 2020, while
SG&A and R&D has increased 95%.
- Monetize the over $30 million in R&D expenditures and data
and increase prices.
- Drive initiatives to begin utilizing Q4’s vast set of
proprietary data.
- Consider establishing sales channels within the investment
banks, comparable to FINSIGHT and virtual data room providers,
where it can potentially garner multiples more average revenue per
customer (ARPC) than it does selling through budget constrained IR
departments.
- Consider moving forward with a dual-exchange listing in the US,
as originally planned, which could widen the Company’s potential
investor base, improve trading volumes, and unlock liquidity.
Moreover, senior management should:
- Immediately increase pricing of its core web hosting and
webinar services to be more representative of the value it provides
its clients. Commoditized virtual data room and b-roll video media
companies often command 5-10 times more fees than Q4 on the same
IPO despite doing a fraction of the work.
- Recognize that a strong culture is predicated on a physically
present team driven by a shared vision. As such, it should
immediately end its company-wide ‘work-from-home’ policy that we
believe is driving significant employee disengagement, attrition
and turnover.
We believe the result of adopting these steps, will be a more
focused and more operationally efficient Company that is better
positioned to capitalize on its irreplicable market share, vast
troves of proprietary data and abundance of cross-sale
opportunities.
In 12-24 months, we would welcome the exploration of strategic
alternatives provided senior management and the Board committed to
an unconflicted and comprehensive sale process, overseen by a
Special Committee that thoroughly advocates for the interests of
all shareholders.
However, and let us be clear, if following a no-vote the Board
does not immediately demonstrate that it is prepared to put the
Company on a new course – FINSIGHT will consider all its rights and
remedies as a shareholder to bring about the changes necessary to
unlock Q4’s full potential.
IV. Finally, to address the question put to us by the
Special Committee in its letter and purportedly shared by other
shareholders regarding our motivations, FINSIGHT’s interest in Q4
is purely financial. The Company can and should be sold for 2-3x
the current Arrangement price.
As the Special Committee itself observed, FINSIGHT is not a
traditional investor. We are sophisticated operators of a capital
markets technology business that is an upstream service provider –
not a competitor to Q4. We understand its business, its ecosystem
and all the stakeholders involved. We are happily prepared to forgo
a quick return on our investment because of the magnitude of the
upside opportunity available for all shareholders if the Company
conducted a proper sale process. We’ve put millions of dollars of
our own capital behind this and on principle, we will not quietly
accept a significantly impaired outcome driven entirely by the
decisions of conflicted insiders and fiduciaries, and nor should
you.
Fellow shareholders, you do not have to accept this
opportunistic transaction. Vote it down.
The time for action has arrived. FINSIGHT encourages you
to VOTE AGAINST
the Arrangement today. If you have already voted “For” the
Arrangement, you can change your vote online to “AGAINST” using the
control number and website that was printed on your proxy or voting
instruction form.
Shareholders with questions about their vote can contact
Carson Proxy Advisors at 1-800-530-5189 or at
info@carsonproxy.com
Sincerely,
Leo EfstathiouCEO, FINSIGHT Group Inc.
About FINSIGHT Group Inc.
FINSIGHT Group Inc is a privately held software service provider
that serves thousands of the world’s leading institutional
investors, investment banks and corporations. Its applications
streamline workflows that facilitate hundreds of billions of
dollars worth of capital markets activity annually to provide
unparalleled visibility and actionable insights into fixed income
and equity capital markets.
Advisors
Goodmans LLP is serving as legal counsel, and Gagnier
Communications and Carson Proxy Advisors are serving as strategic
advisors to FINSIGHT Group Inc.
Shareholder Contact
Carson Proxy Advisors1-800-530-5189(416)
751-2066info@carsonproxy.com
Media Contact
Riyaz Lalani & Dan GagnierGagnier Communications(416)
305-1459FINSIGHT@gagnierfc.com
Disclaimer for Forward-Looking Information
Certain information in this news release may constitute
“forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable
securities legislation. Forward-looking statements and information
generally can be identified by the use of forward-looking
terminology such as “outlook,” “objective,” “may,” “will,”
“expect,” “intend,” “estimate,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “should,”
“plans,” “continue,” or similar expressions suggesting future
outcomes or events. Forward-looking information in this news
release may include, but is not limited to, statements of FINSIGHT
regarding how FINSIGHT intends to exercise its legal rights as a
shareholder of the Company.
Although FINSIGHT believes that the expectations reflected in
any such forward-looking information are reasonable, there can be
no assurance that such expectations will prove to be correct. Such
forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties
that may cause actual results, performance or developments to
differ materially from those contained in the statements. Except as
required by law, FINSIGHT does not intend to update these
forward-looking statements.
Information in Support of Public Broadcast
Solicitation
The following information is provided in accordance with the
corporate and securities laws of the Province of Ontario and
federal laws of Canada applicable therein, applicable to public
broadcast solicitations. FINSIGHT is relying on the exemption under
section 9.2(4) of National Instrument 51-102 – Continuous
Disclosure Obligations ("NI 51-102") to make this
public broadcast solicitation. This solicitation is being made by
FINSIGHT and not by or on behalf of the management of Q4. The
registered office address of Q4 is 99 Spadina Avenue, Suite 500,
Toronto, Ontario M5V 3P8.
FINSIGHT has filed this press release containing the information
required by section 9.2(4)(c) of NI 51-102 on Q4’s company profile
on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
FINSIGHT and Carson Proxy Advisors may solicit proxies in
reliance upon the public broadcast exemption to the solicitation
requirements under corporate and securities laws of the Province of
Ontario and federal laws of Canada applicable therein, conveyed by
way of public broadcast, including through press releases, speeches
or publications, and by any other manner permitted under the
applicable laws. Carson Proxy Advisors has been retained by
FINSIGHT to act as proxy solicitation agent to assist with
FINSIGHT’s solicitation and to provide certain advisory and related
services. FINSIGHT will pay Carson Proxy Advisors a fee of up to
$125,000, plus related expenses. All costs incurred for the
solicitation will be borne by FINSIGHT.
A Q4 shareholder who has given a proxy has the power to revoke
it by depositing an instrument in writing signed by the Q4
shareholder or by the Q4 shareholder’s attorney, who is authorized
in writing, or if the Q4 shareholder is a corporation, by an
officer, or attorney authorized in writing, or by transmitting, by
telephonic or electronic means, a revocation signed by electronic
signature by or on behalf of the Q4 shareholder or by the Q4
shareholder’s attorney, who is authorized in writing, and deposited
with Computershare Investor Services Inc. at any time up to and
including the last business day preceding the day of the Meeting,
or in the case of any adjournment or postponement of the Meeting,
the last business day preceding the day of the adjournment or
postponement, or with the Chair of the Meeting on the day of, and
prior to the start of, the Meeting or any adjournment or
postponement thereof. A Q4 shareholder may also revoke a proxy in
any other manner permitted by law, but prior to the exercise of
such proxy in respect of any particular matter. If a Q4 shareholder
is a non-registered (or beneficial) shareholder, they can contact
their broker or nominee to find out how to change or revoke their
voting instructions and the timing requirements, or for other
voting questions. Intermediaries may set deadlines for the receipt
of revocation notices that are farther in advance of the Meeting
than those set out above and, accordingly, the Q4 shareholder must
take such steps sufficiently in advance of the date of the Meeting
for their Intermediary to act on such revocation. If a Q4
shareholder has followed the process for attending and voting at
the Meeting online, voting at the Meeting online will revoke all
previously submitted proxies. However, in such a case, the Q4
shareholder will be provided with the opportunity to vote by ballot
on the matters put forth at the Meeting. If the Q4 shareholder does
not wish to revoke all previously submitted proxies, they are
instructed to not accept the terms and conditions, in which case
such Q4 shareholder can only enter the Meeting as a guest.
FINSIGHT is a shareholder of Q4. With the exception of the
foregoing, to the knowledge of FINSIGHT, neither FINSIGHT nor any
associates or affiliates of FINSIGHT, has any material interest,
direct or indirect, by way of beneficial ownership of securities or
otherwise, in the Proposed Transaction or any other matter to be
acted upon at the Meeting.
1
https://investors.q4inc.com/events-presentations/default.aspx
Q4 (TSX:QFOR)
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