Ispro
12時間前
The GSEs’ investors’ Sisyphean saga still comes down to the Senior Preferred Stock (SPS) Liquidation Preference (LP), which grows largely in line with the Twins’ retained earnings.
There is a general misunderstanding that the Twins are currently sending profits back to the US government. This is not true. The Treasury is not getting significant cash flows from the Twins at this time. It is all in the SPS LP. The capital stays with the Twins.
The Twins have paid far more to the Treasury than was ever provided to them, but if the SPS LP is affirmed by Treasury, the Twins’ stocks will fall straight to the low single digits, or lower.
If the SPS LP is instead deemed to have been paid off, then all those retained earnings indeed belong to the Twins, and the shares rise 3-4x from current levels initially, and 6-7x in time. I assume exercise of the warrants and ensuing dilution.
The warrants expire in September 2028. I believe there will be action before the warrants expire, which will be just before the next presidential election.
This will likely bring Fannie and Freddie back to the fore, as Trump will be interacting with donors and looking to finish a few things in his lame duck year.
Executive Order 14393 Promoting Access to Mortgage Credit was signed March 13, 2026. This EO gave the FHFA director 120 days to submit a report on the efficiency of national housing finance markets, recommendations on regulations or legislation. That is due right around this July 11th weekend.
Some speculate that this EO report will recommend reducing the Enterprise Regulatory Capital Framework (ERCF), which determines the capital reserve required to be held by both Fannie and Freddie. ...
BR ispro
sometimes_right
15時間前
YOU directed your "Feds learned from 2008" financial crisis comment, when I offered evidence that 300 banks are in jeopardy of failing... So I naturally thought you were an expert on the 2008 financial crisis with special insight into the workings of FDIC Receiverships - your chosen alias is fdicr, after all. Mine is aptly sometimes_right.
But to address your point, ALL of these casualties of the 2008 financial crisis are interrelated in that the FDIC aggressively intervened in various manners...
AND then there's this:
Washington Mutual (WaMu) sold or securitized at least $500 billion in loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac between 2000 and 2008, which accounted for more than a quarter of every dollar in loans WaMu originated during that period Equipo Nizkor.
This massive volume reflects WaMu’s role as one of the largest nonagency issuers of mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the U.S., with its subprime lender Long Beach Mortgage Corporation handling much of the high-risk loan production. From 2000 to 2007, WaMu and Long Beach securitized at least $77 billion in subprime and home equity loans, and WaMu also sold or securitized at least $115 billion in Option ARM loans Equipo Nizkor.
While WaMu originated many of these loans itself, it also acquired them from other lenders and brokers. The loans were then sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or securitized to Wall Street investors, often without full disclosure of risk Equipo Nizkor.
sometimes_right
18時間前
"feds learned from the financial crisis of 2008 that they can print trillions if they need to rescue big banks..."
That's nice to know. So, do you know when the FDIC is going to resolve and terminate WaMu's Receivership???
MANY Legacy shareholders signed releases and would like to see their FINAL settlement distributions... we've been waiting for fourteen years since 2012 and still haven't received court-mediated final distributions... Some speculate the FDIC is using the LIBOR appeal to kick the can down the road because the Too-Big-To-Fail banks can't afford to cover the derivative contracts they wrote each other to "insure" their MBS tranches sold.
Justice delayed is justice denied. Thanks.
newflow Saturday, July 11, 2026 8:24:00 PM Post# 11774of 11774
As per 7th amended plan or reorganization there was no 75% to Class 19 and 25% to Class 22 thru the end even distributions from PAC?.
Gemini's Response:
The Seventh Amended Plan of Reorganization does not establish a fixed "75/25" split for distributions. The idea of a 75/25 split is a common misinterpretation. Instead, the bankruptcy plan—and the subsequent legal frameworks governing the estate—is built on a **strict sequential priority waterfall**.
In bankruptcy law, this waterfall ensures that senior interests are fully satisfied before junior interests receive anything.
### 1. The Sequential Priority Waterfall
The distribution of assets does not occur simultaneously or in fixed percentage chunks; it happens in a specific order:
* **Class 19 (Preferred Equity Interests - Series P, K, etc.):** This class holds a **contractual liquidation preference**. Under the Seventh Amended Plan, they have the absolute priority to receive **100% of their defined face par value** (plus any contractually mandated accrued, unpaid dividends).
* **The "Cap":** Once the Class 19 holders are paid their full par value and preference, their claim against the estate is considered satisfied, and they exit the waterfall entirely. They do not share in any further distributions.
* **Class 22 (Common Equity Interests):** This class sits at the very bottom of the priority tier. They are entitled to receive distributions **only after** all senior claims—including the full payment of Class 19's preference—are satisfied in full.
* **The "Uncapped Upside":** Because Class 22 Common Equity holds the residual interest, their recovery is uncapped. Once Class 19 is fully paid off, **100% of every single dollar** remaining in the audited liquidation pool automatically and legally drops to the Class 22 registry.
### 2. Why the Confusion Exists
The "75/25" figure likely stems from the initial allocation of **Reorganized Common Stock** in the reorganized WMI company back in 2012. At that time, as part of the complex reorganization, the plan allocated a specific portion of the *initial stock issuance* to the different classes of equity to settle the bankruptcy. That was an allocation of *ownership interests in a newly formed entity*, not a fixed split of all future cash distributions from the Liquidating Trust or its successor, Paladin Acquisitions Corporation (PAC).
### Summary
The distribution process from PAC is not about splitting future cash 75/25. It is about a **sequence**:
1. **Audited Pool:** The administrators must monetize the residual assets and satisfy all senior obligations.
2. **Class 19 Payout:** Class 19 Preferred holders get paid their full face value first.
3. **Class 22 Residual:** If there is anything left after Class 19 is fully satisfied, 100% of that remainder goes to Class 22 Common Equity.
The plan is designed to ensure that junior shareholders do not see a return until senior shareholders are made whole, protecting the legal seniority of the Preferred class as established in the 2012 reorganization.
-----------------------
But those shares were cancelled in 2012. How would they be identified by PAC?.
Gemini's Response:
You are asking exactly the right question. If the original shares were "cancelled" in 2012, how does any entity know who you are and what you are owed in 2026?
The answer lies in the transition from **publicly traded shares** to a **private, static registry**. Your shares weren't just deleted into thin air; they were converted into an accounting "hook" that remains in the system.
### 1. The Cancellation was a "Mechanical Swap"
In the 2012 Seventh Amended Plan, the cancellation of the old WMI ticker was a legal formality to clean up the corporate structure. When your shares were "cancelled," the bankruptcy plan simultaneously issued you a **Liquidating Trust Interest** (or equivalent position) in exchange.
Think of it as trading a physical dollar bill for a deposit receipt at a bank. The bill is gone, but the receipt represents your exact claim on the assets remaining in the vault.
### 2. The Private Tracking Pipeline (The "Registry")
Since 2012, and refined during the 2022 transition into Paladin Acquisitions Corporation (PAC), the administrators have maintained a **private transfer registry**. This is not a public stock ticker where shares are traded; it is a static list of names, addresses, and positions.
* **How you are identified:** Your position is currently held in an "archived" or "escrow" status within the Depository Trust Company (DTC) or via the transfer agent records.
* **The "Locked" Nature:** This is why I mentioned earlier that the registry was "structurally locked." By converting the holdings into this private registry, the administrators ensured that the list of beneficiaries could not be diluted, changed, or tampered with by third-party trading. Your identity as a Class 19 or Class 22 holder is fixed in that private registry.
### 3. How PAC "Re-maps" for Distribution
When the Court of Chancery eventually signs the **Final Distribution Order** in Q4 2026, the process will work like this:
1. **The Order:** The court instructs the administrators to distribute the remaining cash pool to the registry.
2. **The Reverse Mapping:** The administrators provide the transfer agent with the "final registry" (the list of all Class 19 and Class 22 holders).
3. **The DTC/Brokerage Credit:** The system performs what is known as a **reverse mapping**. It looks at the archived CUSIP/escrow position in your brokerage account and applies a "credit directive." Essentially, it says: "For every unit of this archived position held by this specific person, credit their account with $X amount of cash."
### Summary: Your "Identity" is Safe
Your shares are not "gone." They exist as an immutable record in a private database that the administrators use for the final payout. You do not need to "prove" your ownership in 2026; the registry already knows who you are because your position was migrated and locked into this pipeline during the 2012 transition and the 2022 corporate combination.
The system is currently in "standby," holding that list until the statutory clock runs out on September 13, 2026, and the court gives the final go-ahead to trigger the credit.
https://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=177779417
Per Copilot:
Why “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks May Struggle to Cover Their Derivative Contracts
Large U.S. banks—often labeled “too big to fail” due to their systemic importance—hold a dominant share of the nation’s derivatives activity. As of 2023, just four megabanks accounted for 87% of all U.S. bank derivatives, with the top four holding 88% of all derivatives in the banking sector Congress.gov+1. These institutions manage trillions in notional amounts, much of it in interest rate derivatives, which can be long-term and complex.
Why Coverage Could Be a Problem
Concentration of risk: Because these banks dominate derivatives markets, a large-scale market dislocation—such as sharp interest rate moves or commodity price spikes—can trigger massive margin calls. If counterparties are on the wrong side of the trade, the bank could face losses far exceeding its capital cushions Congress.gov+1.
Long maturities: Many of these derivatives have maturities over five years, meaning banks are exposed to interest rate changes for extended periods. During rapid Fed rate hikes, they may have been on the “wrong” side of trades, but the counterparties (often other banks or market participants) were on the “right” side, so the losses were absorbed by them rather than the megabanks Wall Street On Parade.
Interconnectedness: Major swap dealers and clearing participants are often affiliates of these large banks. If one fails, losses can spread through the derivatives network, amplifying systemic risk Congress.gov.
The 2023 Bank Failures Context
In 2023, regional banks like Silicon Valley Bank, First Republic Bank, and Signature Bank collapsed amid steep interest rate hikes. These failures highlighted that smaller banks often failed to use derivatives to hedge interest rate risk, which contributed to their insolvency Congress.gov. This contrasted with the megabanks, which—despite holding massive derivatives—seem to have avoided large losses during the same period, raising questions about their risk management and whether they are truly “too big to fail” Wall Street On Parade.
Policy and Supervision
Regulators, including the OCC, have long flagged the systemic risk from concentrated derivatives activity. The FDIC and Federal Reserve have been reviewing “living wills” for the largest banks, assessing their resolution plans and loss-absorbing capacity Wall Street On Parade+1. Proposals include expanding resolution planning and loss-absorbing requirements to more banks, not just the largest IMF.
In short: While “too big to fail” banks may be able to absorb some losses due to size and capital, their heavy reliance on derivatives—especially interest rate swaps—means they remain exposed to systemic shocks. If market conditions change and counterparties are on the wrong side of these trades, they could face margin calls that strain their balance sheets, potentially undermining the “too big to fail” narrative.
sometimes_right
21時間前
The Next BANKING CRISIS Has ALREADY BEGUN...
Wall Street Truthbombs
Jul 11, 2026 #foryou #stockmarket #investing
Wall Street just launched an entirely new credit default swap index, giving institutional investors a way to hedge—or bet against—private credit funds and regional banks. Why now?
In this episode of Wall Street Truthbombs, Mark Malek explains what credit default swaps really are, why the world's largest banks created this market, what massive redemption requests from private credit funds are signaling, and why refinancing costs may become the next major risk facing the financial system.
You'll learn how private credit, regional banks, and rising defaults are becoming increasingly interconnected—and why Wall Street's actions may reveal more than the headlines.
If you want macroeconomic analysis before it reaches the mainstream media, subscribe and join us every day for Wall Street Truthbombs.
sometimes_right
2日前
San Diego buyers are lining up for homes not yet on the market
Key takeaways
Unlisted Platform: Lets buyers express interest in homes not yet on the market and allows homeowners to gauge potential selling interest before listing.
Hot Neighborhoods: Popular areas include Clairemont, Bay Ho, Bay Park, and North Park, with 24 homes waitlisted across nine ZIP codes so far.
Flexible Timing & Options: Useful for buyers with specific timelines, including military families, and helps homeowners collect data and plan potential sales.
San Diego homebuyers struggling to find the right home can now take a shot at ones that aren't even on the market with the help of a new website.
Why it matters: Unlisted allows homeowners to gauge interest in their home before they're ready to sell, and buyers can potentially get ahead of their competition by making their interest known.
The new tool could shake up San Diego's real estate market, which has limited homes for sale, high prices, historically low sales, and low turnover rates as owners stay put.
How it works: The site features every property listed in the public record. Visitors can search for a house by address and place their name on a waitlist to be considered when the home hits the market.
The homeowner is notified and can chat with the prospective buyer directly or through agents.
It's the modern version of leaving a note on the front porch: "I love your house. Here's my number if you sell."
It can be slim pickings for young parents looking for family-size homes and prospective buyers with median incomes, but this platform gives them more potential options in the neighborhoods they're interested in.
It's particularly useful for people who are flexible on timing.
Reality check: The site lists every home in the public record, but they aren't for sale — yet.
"People warm up to the idea of selling," it doesn't happen overnight, Unlisted founder Katie Hill tells Axios.
Unlisted allows homeowners to inch toward that decision and collect data along the way about the interest in their property, she says.
Zoom in: San Diego has 24 waitlisted homes across nine ZIP codes so far, and a handful of owners have claimed their homes.
(see link to view active map.)
Clairemont, Bay Ho and Bay Park neighborhoods are the most sought-after, with a total of nine homes waitlisted.
North Park is another "hot spot" in this limited sample.
Pick a home, any home. Photo: Courtesy of Unlisted
The intrigue: The platform could be a new resource for military families looking to move in or out of San Diego because they can set their timelines to buy or sell around deployments or orders, Hill says.
Between the lines: A homeowner can search for their property, update the home's information and photos, and provide a potential timeline for when they may consider moving.
They can also remove their home from the website completely.
The big picture: Most of Unlisted's activity is concentrated in Midwest and East Coast cities like Chicago and D.C., but it's gaining traction in California, according to Hill.
About 40,000 homes nationwide have been waitlisted since Unlisted launched last year, including nearly 9,300 in the D.C. area.
The bottom line: The platform expands the options and timelines for potential home sales, but it can't guarantee a property will get listed or fall within your price range.
The median sale price of a single-family home in San Diego County has hovered around $1.2 million for the past three years, per Redfin.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/realestate/san-diego-buyers-are-lining-up-for-homes-not-yet-on-the-market/ar-AA27EatK?
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